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"THE DULLEST BILL": REFLECTIONS ON THE
LABOUR CODE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
H. W. ARTHURSt
[I]f you went over the history of the labour legislation of this Province,
this is the dullest bill that has ever gone through the legislature as far
as opposition goes.... [T]his bill is being accepted as a real honest
attempt to solve the problems."
I. INTRODUCTION
The Labour Code of British Columbia' may or may not have
generated the intensity of debate over labour relations policy which
has characterised much of the political history of that province. But
if '"the dullest bill" was lacking in political titillation, its enactment
at least marks an important milestone in the evolution of Canadian
labour law.
The Code represents the logical extrapolation of recent legislative
experiments in other provinces' and at the federal level,' as well as
the first attempt to give effect to certain recommendations of such
dissimilar bodies as the 1968 Rand Commission in Ontario,' and
t B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Professor and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto.
I gratefully acknowledge the efforts of my colleagues, Peter Hogg and
particularly George Adams, and of my research assistant, Janice Baker, to
prevent me from committing errors and uttering follies.
1 Hon. L. T. Nimsick, Minister of Mines and Petroleum Resources (1973)
BRITISH COLUMBIA LEOxsLA=IVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES, at 464; hereinafter
referred to as DEBATES.
2 Labour Code of British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122 (Bill I 3, assented
to 7 November 1973), hereinafter referred to as "the Code".
3 Principally Manitoba Labour Relations Act, S.M. 1972, C. 75; Ontario
Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232; Saskatchewan Trade Union Act,
S.S. 1972, c. 137.
4 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-z, as am. by S.C. 1972, c. I8.
5 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION INQuRY INTO LABOUR DISPUTES (the
"Rand Report") (1968).
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the 1969 federal Task Force on Industrial Relations.' It contains,
moreover, some unique features which, if proven effective over the
years, will no doubt in turn influence legislators across the country.
Above all, the Code places squarely in issue the future of Canadian
courts in labour relations - both as primary actors in the regulation
of strikes and picketing through the use of damages and injunctions,
and in their secondary role in reviewing decisions of labour relations
boards and arbitrators. For all of these reasons, the Code invites
reflection.
Reflection, of course, is no substitute for the careful analysis that
can only come after the statute has operated for a time in the real
world of industrial relations. The changing seasons of economic
growth and decline, the unpredictable climates of provincial,
national and international politics, social stability and turmoil, the
kaleidescopic procession of personalities and institutions, will all test
the Code in due course. But now, at its inception, only reflection is
possible; this note will have to be largely descriptive and speculative.
I. THE EVOLVING SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS
In terms of substantive law, the Code makes many important, but
very few fundamental, changes in the existing rules. As will be seen,
many of these changes have been foreshadowed by similar changes
in federal and provincial legislation. As will also be seen, many of
the more striking departures in the legislation are to be found in
connection with the enhanced role of the Labour Relations Board
and of other administrative agencies, and with the diminished role
of the courts, a topic explored more fully in the third part of this
note.
A. The Coverage of the Statute
The Code brings within the regime of collective bargaining several
groups which had formerly been denied its protections and relieved
of its responsibilities. "Dependent contractors" and supervisory em-
ployees are now permitted to bargain collectively. The first group is
broadly defined to embrace any individual
who performs work or services for another person ... on such terms and
conditions that he is ... in a position of economic dependence upon...
6 CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE Rz.EPORT OF THE FEDERAL TASK
FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS (the "Woods Report") (1968).
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that person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee
than that of an independent contractor ....
Such individuals may be included within bargaining units when
(a) a majority of [them] consent to representation by the trade-union;
and
(b) reasonable procedures have been developed to integrate dependent
contractors into the bargaining unit.3
Interestingly, however, the Code appears to protect only those
dependent contractors who have been brought within a bargaining
unit in this fashion. Unlike the Canada Labour Code,9 dependent
contractors are not simply treated as a species of employee unless
they have been included in a bargaining unit by the Labour Rela-
tions Board."0 Accordingly, in British Columbia, dependent contrac-
tors do not appear to enjoy protection against unfair labour practices
w* hich may occur prior to the establishment of a bargaining unit,
nor are they able to band together in a bargaining unit composed
solely of dependent contractors.
Supervisory employees, however, may be included either within
an all-employee unit or within a unit composed entirely of super-
visors." In either case, the statute appears to draw a line between
such employees and persons "employed for the primary purpose of
exercising management functions over other employees," the latter
group being excluded from "employee" rights in British Columbia 2
as they are, typically, in other Canadian jurisdictions.
A third group brought within the regime of collective bargaining
is policemen.1 However, as will be seen, the disputes of policemen
and other public safety workers may be settled through voluntary
arbitration, rather than by economic conflict."
7 The Code, s. I (I). This definition provoked an extended legislative debate,
concerned principally with the issue of whether someone who himself
employed other individuals might be considered a "dependent contractor".
The potential application of this section in the woods industry was explored
by several opposition spokesmen. See DEBATES, supra, note i, at 694 et seq.
8 The Code, s. 48.
9 Canada Labour Code, supra, note 4, s. 107().
10 The Code, s. i (s).
21 Id., s. 47.
12 Id., s. I(r).
Is See, e.g., Canada Labour Code, supra, note 4, s. 107; Manitoba Labour
Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 1 (k) ; Ontario Labour Relations Act, id., s.
1(3) (b); Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, id., s. 2(f) (i).
14 The Code, s. i (s).
5 Id., s. 73.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the Code does not follow the trend
developing elsewhere in the country of including some or all of the
professions within its reach."6 Indeed, the professional exclusion in
British Columbia would appear to be somewhat broader than it is
elsewhere. Equally, it should be noted that public servants in British
Columbia are treated under a separate, although interlocking,
statute ' rather than under the basic private sector statute as in
Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba." What the new Code does
not do, then, is in a sense more significant than what it does do in
this area.
B. The Acquisition of Bargaining Rights
No fundamental departures are made in this area from the pre-
vailing pattern of Canadian legislation. In British Columbia, as else-
where, a union may seek bargaining rights by asking the employer
to recognize it voluntarily, and without benefit of formal sanction by
the Labour Relations Board. However, unlike the Ontario act,"9
for example, the new Code makes no explicit provision for the volun-
tary recognition of a trade union by an employer, although this
possibility is implicitly recognized.20 Following the expiry of a first
agreement, either party is entitled to serve notice for renegotiation,2"
without regard to whether or not the union's bargaining authority
rests on a certificate.22 While these -arrangements may be agreeable
to the contracting parties, inter se, it should be noted that the Code
provides no mechanism whereby employees who wish to challenge
16 See, e.g., Canada Labour Code, supra; note 4, ss. 107(), 125(3) ; Manitoba
Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, ss. I (t), 29(3); Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Act, id., ss. i (1)(1), 6(3); Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141,
s. 2o, am. by S.Q. x965, c. 50, S. 2, S.Q. 1969, c. 47, s. 9, S.Q. 1970, c. 33,
s. i and S.Q. 1971, c. 44, s. i; Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, supra, note
3, s. 2(f) (ii).
21 Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 144.
18 See Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, supra, note 3, S. 2(f), (g). In Quebec,
public servants are governed by the Labour Code, supra, note 16, am. by
S.Q. 1969, c. 47, interlocked with the Civil Service Act, S.Q. 1965, c. 14,
am. by the Civil Service Department Act, S.Q. 1969, c. 14. S. 3 of the
Manitoba Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, binds the Crown, but s. 4(3)
makes the Act subject to the Civil Service Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-1o,
which includes provisions for collective bargaining and interest arbitration in
ss. 47-56.
19 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 38(4).
20 Sections 39(2) (b) (i) and 46(c) of the Code both contemplate an applica-
tion for certification by a union which has already executed an agreement on
the basis of voluntary recognition.
21 Id., s. 62.
22 Id., s. 63.
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the union's right to represent them may do so.23 Indeed, whereas in
Ontario a collective agreement meets the statutory definition only
if it has been consummated by "a trade union that ... represents
employees of the employer,"24 no similar requirement is found in the
definition of a "collective agreement" in British Columbia. 5 In
Ontario," but not in British Columbia, ' moreover, the right of a
voluntary recognized union to negotiate union security arrangements
is severely limited. Thus, the Code leaves open the possibility of col-
lusive arrangements between an employer and a union, or at least of
arrangements which do not originate in the authentic desire of the
employees for representation by the union claiming to act on their
behalf.
But these cases of voluntary recognition, whether authentic or
illicit, are not likely to be the norm. For the most part, employees
will be represented by bargaining agents, freely selected by them,
through procedures administered by the board. As in all other Cana-
dian jurisdictions, once this selection process has taken place, the
focus of attention shifts to the establishment of collective bargaining
relationships which are stabilized for a period of time after their
commencement. During this period, the right of employees to alter
their bargaining representative is suspended.2" However, the moment
at which employees are once again permitted to exercise their free-
dom to select a new bargaining agent is to arrive rather earlier in
British Columbia than, for example, in Ontario.'
This promise of greater flexibility is reflected elsewhere in the
provisions dealing with bargaining rights. For example, craft or
technical bargaining units are to be established essentially upon
request, although subject to subsequent annexation (with the consent
of a majority of the craft employees) to a larger unit.30
In circumstances where the board is unable to hold a representa-
tion vote because of circumstances making it impossible to ascertain
the true wishes of the employees, the board may nonetheless certify
23 Cf. Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 52.
24 Id., s. x(x)(e); see United Steelworkers of America v. Niagara Crushed
Stone (Humberstone) Ltd. (1958) 58 C.L.L.C. para. x6,xx8 (O.L.R.B.).
25 The Code, s. i (i).
26 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 38(4).
27 The Code, s. 9.
28 Id., S. 39.
29 Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 5' (one year as compared to six months
in British Columbia).
80 The Code, s. 41.
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the trade union, but impose upon it conditions which are required
to be substantially fulfilled within a fixed period following certifica-
tion, failing which, certification is deemed to be cancelled.3 Presum-
ably, the conditions are intended to safeguard the interests of the
employees who thus come to be represented by a union which they
have never chosen. For example, the union might be required to
persuade a given percentage of employees to become members within
a fixed period of time following certification; upon nonperformance
of this obligation, its bargaining rights would lapse, since a union
without employee support has no real future as a bargaining agent."2
In keeping with the general trend of Canadian legislation the
Code provides that associated or related employers may be treated
as a single employer,"3 that two or more unrelated employers can
be so regarded,3' and that an employers' association may apply to
be accredited as the bargaining agent for a number of firms." All
of these provisions have counterparts in other Canadian labour
statutes; all respond to the admonition of the federal Task Force
Report which favoured both greater flexibility and potentially
greater centralization of bargaining."
Unlike Ontario, and several other provinces, which have adopted
the accreditation device, British Columbia does not confine its
application to the construction industry. However, in another sense
the British Columbia legislation is much more restrictive, since
accreditation would appear to vest the accredited association with
bargaining authority only for its members or for those who agree
that it should act as their spokesman. By contrast, in Ontario, an
accredited association has the authority to speak for all unionized
employers in a particular industrial sector or geographic area. '
Whether accreditation, thus limited, adds significantly to the authori-
tative status of employers' associations is problematic.3
Certainly the particular problems of the construction industry,
s' Id., ss. 8 (4) (e), 43 (3).-
32 See International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Lodge 359 and Forano Ltd.
[1974] 1 CANADIAN L.R.B.R. i3, at 19-22 (B.C. L.R.B.) for an analysis of
the objectives and criteria of this section.
33 The Code, s. 37-
84 Id., s. 40.
3 5 Id., s. 59.
38 Supra, note 6, paras. 193-203, 530-34, 549-52.
37 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. x3.
38 Crispo and Arthurs, Countervailing Employer Power: Accreditation of
Contractor Associations, in Goldenberg and Crispo, eds., CoNsTaucTZoN
LABOUR RELATIONS (1968) 376.
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which elsewhere are regarded as the primary reason for introducing
accreditation," are not specifically dealt with in any definitive
fashion by the new Code. Perhaps the contemplated Construction
Industry Advisory Council" will lead to a clearer focus within the
administration of the legislation upon the special problems flowing
from the unusual rhythm of employment within that industry.
A final point of some significance is that a union may win bargain-
ing rights by demonstrating either that a majority of the employees
in a bargaining unit are its members or that a majority "wish to be
represented by the trade-union."'" These two grounds for certifica-
tion are treated in somewhat disparate fashion, although not entirely
so. When the union is able to show membership of between thirty-
five and fifty percent, the board must hold a confirmatory representa-
tion vote,42 presumably so the union can muster a majority composed
partly of members and partly of non-member supporters. By con-
trast, in Ontario, the vote must be held unless the union can demon-
strate a majority of not merely fifty, but of sixty-five percent,"3 a
much more stringent requirement.
But the board may also conduct a representation vote "in any
case." 44 This section enables the board to hold a vote when the
union's membership exceeds fifty percent, but where its claim to
majority status45 is nonetheless impugned.
In either case, the board has ruled, the union is required merely
to secure a majority of those actually voting rather than of all eligible
voters.4 1 In so doing, the board brushed aside what appears to be a
specific admonition of the Code that it be "satisfied that a majority
of the employees in the unit ... wish to be represented' 7 by the
union, holding:
[T]he language of s. 45, read in the context of the rest of Part III of
the Code, leaves the Board a great deal of flexibility in the use it can
29 Bain, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGISLATION AND THE MANITOBA CONSTRUC-
TION INDUSTRY (1971).
40 The Code, s. 124.
41: Id.,1s. 45(t).
42 Id., s. 43(2).
43 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 7(2).
44 The Code, s. 43(1).
45 Id., s. 45(1).
46 Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers v.
Noranda Metals Industries Ltd. [1974] 1 CANADIAN L.R.B.R. 115 (B.C.
L.R.B.).
47 The Code, S. 45().
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make of representation votes in satisfying itself as to whether "a majority
wish to be represented by the trade-union". If that is so, then a fortiori
the Board is not rigidly bound by a legal rule that a union must secure
a majority of all eligible voters as a condition precedent to certifi-
cation.
48
Subsequently, the board's view of the majority requirement was
adopted by a clarifying amendment to the statute. 48a
On balance, it is difficult to predict whether the British Columbia
arrangements are more likely to help unions win bargaining rights
than those in Ontario. The Ontario experience suggests that unions
overwhelmingly prefer to seek certification on the basis of member-
ship rather than of representation votes 9 and the lower membership
threshold would thus seem to promote unionization. However, how
many Ontario unions are stranded between the fifty and s'hxty-five
percent membership marks is not known; the marginal utility to
unions of the lower requirement therefore cannot be assessed.
In sum, all of these departures from prevailing Canadian legisla-
tive patterns can be described as "fine tuning". They should help, to
some modest degree, to facilitate the application of the Code's pro-
cedural arrangements to the varied circumstances in which em-
ployees may lay claim to bargaining rights. But they do not per se
fundamentally change the position of either labour or management
in British Columbia.
Finally, it must be said that a close reading of the provisions of
the Code relating to certification discloses a number of technical dis-
crepancies and inconsistencies, some of which were explored in the
board's early decision in Canadian Association of Industrial etc.
Workers v. Western Canada Steel, Ltd." In that case, the board took
the position that it had a commitment to make the legislation work:
In interpreting these sections, we must take a realistic view of the nature
of complicated provisions which have accumulated over a long period
of time. This whole body of law was substantially revised in the fall of
1973. It is only natural to find that the draftsman may not have antici-
48 Supra, note 46, at I ,8.
4saStatute Law Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 87, s. 22 (Bill 162).
49 Annual statistics in Ontario show that from 1968-1971, unions sought certifi-
cation on the basis of membership (rather than by representation vote) in
85-90% of all applications. In 197i, the Ontario Act was amended, requir-
ing union to prove 655 membership rather than the former 55%7. Following
1971, certifications sought on the basis of membership declined slightly to
about 8o% of all applications.
5o Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers, Local
z (B.C.) et al. and Western Canada Steel Limited et al. [1974] 1 CANADIAN
L.R.B.R. 22 (B.C. L.R.B.).
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pated the effect of his major changes on every other related provision
in the Code. We can expect to find a great many situations in which,
on their face at least, different parts of the Code may not fit perfectly
together. It is up to a tribunal such as this one, charged with the task
of administering the whole Code and thus seeing these unanticipated
cases as they appear one by one, to try to smooth off the rough edges
in the legislation to the extent this is legally permissible. The basic lines
of the legislative scheme must always be kept at the fore in the interpre-
tation of the detailed clauses. The ample discretion which has been
conferred on the Board must always be exercised in a way which sees
that the statutory policy is respected in individual cases.51
These sections may well be viewed as a proving ground for the
creative craftsmanship of the board, as well as for the government's
announced policy of avoiding legalism in the administration of its
labour legislation. But while both the board and the government
may wish to shelter from judicial review behind the Code's privative
clauses, it must not be forgotten that speedy legislative correction of
errors is the quid pro quo for the exclusion of the courts.5
C. Protecting the Right to Organize
If the new procedural arrangements for winning bargaining rights
represent no radical departure, the Code!s attempt to guarantee the
rights of workers to organize for collective bargaining is slightly
more far-reaching.
The basic rights and protections are couched in familiar terms:
the freedom to be a member of a trade union and to participate in
its lawful activities;5" protection against discrimination or discharge
designed to interfere with such rights; 4 guarantees of the indepen-
dence of trade unions from employer interference."5 However, the
new Code also specifically outlaws a number of employer unfair
labour practices which were formerly prohibited only inferentially,
if at all: the promise or introduction of a wage increase either dur-
ing the union's organizing campaign, 8 or after it has won bargaining
51 Id., at 25.
52 As the Hon. W. S. King, Minister of Labour, supra, note 1, at 1047, stated:
In terms of the powers of the board, I would suggest that the Legislature
certainly sits every year. Any question or inference of unbridled powers
without checks and balances are always subject to review in this Legisla-
ture, which is the highest law-making agency in the land.
53 The Code, s. 2 (1).
54 Id., S. 3(2).
55 Id., s. 30x).
56 Id., ss. 3(2) (c), 51 (1).
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rights during negotiations;"' interference with lawful concerted
action designed to promote organization;58 and denial of access to
employees who reside on property owned or controlled by their
employer." None of these provisions takes British Columbia farther
than many other jurisdictions have gone as a result of either labour
board interpretation or statutory enactment.
To avoid any doubt on the matter, the Code specifically preserves
the employer's residual rights to discipline or lay off employees for
proper cause,"0 to control the place of employment during working
hours,"' and ultimately to suspend or discontinue operations for
reasons unconnected with collective bargaining.6 2 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, in view of the Code's concern to protect the freedom of speech
of workers,6" the government declined to define the scope of legiti-
mate employer appeals to his employees, as has been done in
Ontario.6 Recent research casts some doubt upon the coercive effect
-indeed upon the efficacy -of employer appeals.6" However, it
is clear that the government's intention was neither to adopt a
regime of laissez faire, nor to make "an employer's absolute rights
implicit in the legislation," but rather to permit the board to "weigh
any legitimate employer interests."' 6 This approach was promptly
adopted by the board which issued a total prohibition against any
employer appeals pending a representation vote ordered against the
background of a series of unfair labour practices.6'
The Codes real innovations are to be found in the arsenal of
remedies made available to the Labour Relations Board. As under
the former Act, the board has broad pow er to direct that offending
57 Id., s. 61(1) (c).
58 Id., s. 3(2) (f).
5' Id., s. 4(4).
60 Id., 55. 3(2), 51 (2), 61(3).
61 Id., s. 4().
62" Id., s. 83 (1).
G3 Id., s. 84. The section relates to appeals by means other than picketing which
"communicate information to any person ... as to matters ... relating to
terms or conditions of employment or work ... to be done by that person,"
a definition theoretically broad enough to encompass employer communica-
tion, although clearly not intended to do so.
64 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 56. An opposition attempt to
secure a similar "free speech" proviso was reluffed; DEBATES, supra, note x,
817-19.
65 See Getman and Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise (1972) 39
U. CH. L. REv. 681.
66 Hon. W. S. King, Minister of Labour, DEBATES, supra, note i. at 8x8.
07- Supra, note 32.
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conduct cease, that its effect be rectified, and that any monetary loss
to injured employees be made good."' It may rely upon presumptions
or reverse onuses to make findings of illegal employer motive which
might otherwise be impossible to prove," and it now has power as
well to require the employer to restore illegally altered working
conditions.7 These remedies, however, are liable to be frustrated by
an intransigent employer who is clever enough to escape detection,
stubborn enough to litigate many individual unfair practice pro-
ceedings, or tough enough to force a union to an impasse in bargain-
ing for a first agreement. Such time-consuming and demoralizing
tactics may well succeed in depriving a newly-organized, insecure
union of employee support or provoking it into rash reprisals. Of
such stuff are the most intractable labour disputes often made. The
Code makes two important new remedies available in such situations.
First, the board may certify the union although a true expression
of employee sentiment has been made impossible by employer unfair
labour practices."' In this respect, the Code goes further than other
statutes which only permit certification in like circumstances if the
union has, at some point, been able to muster majority support 72
The British Columbia rule is obviously preferable since it deprives
an employer of any incentive to move early against a union in order
to forestall a membership drive. Nonetheless, the board has indi-
cated that it will exercise its new-found power cautiously, at least in
situations where the complainant union is unable to show that "the
original momentum of the campaign made a majority very likely,"
where "certification would be just a futile gesture" because of the
union's fragility, and where another union with better prospects of
survival is waiting in the wings."
Second, the board has a unique power to impose a first collective
agreement upon the parties.' This prospect should discourage em-
68 The Code, s. 8(4) (a)-(c).
69 Id., ss. 8(7), 83(2). See DEBATES, supra, note i, at 825-28, on opposition
to the reverse onus in s. 8(7). There was no debate on s. 83(2). The Quebec
Labour Code, supra, note 16, contains a similar provision in s. 86.
70 The Code, s. 8(4) (d).
71 Id., ss. 8(4) (e), 43(3)-
72 Cf., Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 7(4)-
73 Supra, note 32, at 21-2.
74 The Code, ss. 70, 71. See Wholesale and Retail Delivery Drivers Union v.
London Drugs Ltd. [8974] 1 CANADIAN L.R.B.R. 140 (B.C. L.R.B.), in
which the board analyzed the purpose of "this unusual device" as remedying
"the variety of methods by which bona fide and reasonable collective bargain-
ing may be frustrated."
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ployer intransigence in bargaining premised on the belief that a
newly-certified union will lose the loyalty of its members if it cannot
quickly secure an agreement for them. Presumably, too, the device
can be used to rescue an employer from the unrealistic expectations
of novice union negotiators. However, the new section does represent
a sharp departure from the traditional N.D.P. philosophy that the
outcome of collective bargaining should be determined by an
economic contest, rather than by legal intervention. As such, it
atrracted the principled opposition of some unionists and even
labour-supported government members. As one stated:
I campaigned against compulsory arbitration.... I cannot accept a
provision that in any way allows for compulsory arbitration, even
though in this case that compulsory arbitration appears to be in favour
of the trade union movement...75
D. The Collective Bargaining Process
Good faith is so central to the process of collective bargaining that
it is written into the very definition of "collective bargaining" in the
new Code." The statute also provides both an affirmative duty to
bargain in a good faith,"7 and a specific sanction for breach of that
duty:
No trade-union or employer shall fail or refuse to bargain collectively
in good faith ... and to make every reasonable effort to conclude a
collective agreement .... 71
Breach of this prohibition is an unfair labour practice, giving rise to
the remedial intervention of the board already described.
Moreover, it should be noted that "the extent to which the parties
have, or have not, bargained in good faith" is "among other things"
a matter the board "may take into account" in imposing a first
collective agreement on the parties."' Thus, the board appears to
have the right to impose compulsory arbitration even where there
has been good faith bargaining."' But despite this possibility, it seems
'5 C. S. Gabelmann (N.D.P., North Vancouver-Seymour), DEBATES, supra, note
1, 457. Mr. Gabelmann and Mr. Steves (N.D.P., Richmond) both voted
against s. 70 in the Committee stage of the Bill; id., at 996.
76 The Code, s. i(i).
77 Id., s. 63.
78 Id., s. 6 [emphasis added].
79 Id., s. 71.
80 Hon. W. S. King, Minister of Labour, DEBATES, supra, note r, at 517:
[W]e cannot be so doctrinaire ... in our attitude and our lip service to
free collective bargaining as the appropriate and usual way of regulating
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paradoxically inevitable that the board will be drawn even more
deeply than other Canadian labour relations boards into the thank-
less task of defining "good faith" in the context of collective bargain-
ing"' On the one hand, British Columbia now has what all other
Canadian jurisdictions lack - an effective remedy for intransigence
and bad faith, at least in connection with negotiations for a first
agreement. On the other hand, the very attractiveness of the remedy
may soon produce a deluge of complaints unless the board can
develop restrictive guidelines for its use: "good faith" seems likely to
be the talisman for employers resisting compulsory arbitration of
first collective agreements.82
The Code by no means depends solely on sanctions to promote
collective bargaining. An orderly and standardized timetable is
provided for negotiations. Notice to bargain may be served four
months prior to the expiry of an agreement, and is automatically
deemed to have been served sixty days prior to expiry;83 even agree-
ments for lengthy terms may be reopened (with ministerial
approval) three months prior to any anniversary date, unless the
parties agree in advance to the contrary 8 ' The labour minister is to
be given notice of all negotiations from their inception,"5 and may
proffer mediation services upon the request of the parties, or "at any
time... where he is of the opinion that [mediation] is likely to con-
tribute to more harmonious industrial relationships between the
parties."85 Reasonable despatch is assured by a requirement that the
parties meet within ten days after notice to bargain is given,8 by the
absence of any minimum period before mediation can be invoked,
and by the requirement that the mediator very rapidly report back
to the minister, unless the parties agree to extend his mandate."'
these affairs and at the same time turn a blind eye to a situation where a
new and usually weak unit, often composed of females, who perhaps haven't
got the economic muscle that the major unions have, suffers and is denied
the right to enjoy a collective agreement which is implied by the certifica-
tion in the first instance....
See also his comments, id., at 995.
81 Cf., Palmer, The Myth of "Good Faith" in Collective Bargaining (1966)
ALTA. L. REV. 409; Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith (1958) 71
HAv. L. REv. 14o.
82 See Delivery Drivers Union v. London Drugs, supra, note 74, where the board
indicated it would take a similar approach.
83 The Code, s. 62.
84 Id., s. 66.
85 Id., s. 62(2).
86 Id., s. 69(2).
87 Id., s. 63.
88 Id., s. 69(3).
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Unfortunately, the Code fails to define the mediator's functions, 9
although his general objective, as noted, is "to contribute to more
harmonious industrial relationships between the parties." The signi-
ficance of this failure is suggested by contrasting the two alternative
methods of reporting provided by the legislation. In the absence of
contrary instructions, the mediator is to report "setting out the
matters upon which the parties have and have not agreed;"* how-
ever, upon the request of either party, and subject to ministerial
direction, his report must "include recommended terms of settle-
ment."91 As the literature amply records,9 2 the latter "normative"
style of mediation is apt to focus the attention of the parties on
"building a record" and "making a case," rather than on the
exchange of concessions which is more conducive to settlement. The
former method implies that the parties are free to move towards
each other without the risk that their positions will be criticized, or
even further compromised, by a subsequent report, albeit one which
is not legally binding.
What is to be done with a report containing recommended terms
of settlement is not clear. The minister is himself empowered to
"receive and hold in confidence a proposal made by any of the
parties for the settlement of a dispute or difference.'"93 Employees
of the Department of Labour (including mediators) are, somewhat
less specifically, authorized to retain information which "shall not
be open to inspection by any person or any court."94 While the
minister retains the right not to disclose, or to partially disclose,
"information [which] relates to the business or affairs of any person
... disclosure of [which] would be prejudicial,"9 the fact remains
that there is no clear indication of whether the position of the parties
89 Cf., Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 17(I), where a con-
ciliation officer is directed to "confer with the parties and endeavour to effect
a collective agreement." The Hon. Mr. King pointed to mediation as a face-
saving device for the parties; DEBATES, supra, note I, at 993-
90 The Code, s. 69(3).
91 Id., s. 69(4).
92 See generally, Logan, STATE INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 1943-1954 (1956); Phillips,
Government Conciliation in Labour Disputes: Some Recent Experiences in
Ontario (1956) 22 CAN. J. ECON. 523; Levinson, Compulsory Conciliation
Machinery in Ontario (1958) 1 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47; Taylor, Conciliation[19541 LECTURES L.S.U.C. 113; Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions(1971) 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305.
93 The Code, s. 127().
9' Id., S. 127(3).
95 Id., s. 127(2).
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in negotiation is to be made public, either in connection with recom-
mended terms of settlement or otherwise.96
The effectiveness of mediation under the Code will ultimately
depend upon the calibre of mediators recruited and deployed by the
minister. Certainly, the prospects of success can only appear brighter
than they were under the rn-starred, grandiose Mediation Commis-
sion Act.
9 7
Finally, to assure that mediators (and others concerned with the
administration of labour relations policies) operate against a back-
ground of accurate information, a broad mandate is conferred on
the minister to
inquire into any matter relating to the relationships between employers
and employees, the maintenance of industrial peace, and the settlement
of disputes, including ... matters relating to economic growth, labour-
management relations, productivity, problems of adjustment, industrial
research, technological research, and any other matter that will assist
in the accumulation and dissemination of industrial and labour
information."'
Neither information nor sweet reason are likely to induce labour
lambs to lie down with management lions (or vice versa), or to
assure that every attempt at collective bargaining produces a
mutually acceptable agreement. But information can dispel unneces-
sary conflicts over facts, and can provide both the parties and
government with a basis for long-range planning and institutional
change. Information, research and reflection, too, may temper
unrealistic public expectations about the imminent advent of the
millenium.
E. Protection of the Public Interest
British Columbia, like many other Canadian jurisdictions, relies
upon the appointment of an ad hoc Industrial Inquiry Commission
as the potential response to labour disputes, existing or apprehended,
which have high public visibility." Perhaps betraying a high degree
of optimism, the Code also provides that the parties may agree in
advance to accept the Commission's report, and are then bound to
96 The Labour Ombudsman, discussed infra, at note 232, has power to compel
disclosure of information for the purposes of his investigation, the Code, s.
137.
97 S.B.C. x968, c. 26, am. by S.B.C. 1972 (2d), c. 8, repealed by the Code, s.
151(b).
98 The Code, s. 123(1).
9 Id., s. 122.
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do so."00 However, in the absence of such agreement, the report has,
at most, a suasive effect on the parties and on public opinion.
Assuming that some labour disputes will slip through this web of
mediative devices, the government has had to confront the difficult
issue of how far to permit its support of the collective bargaining
process to impinge upon other important public interests. By compari-
son with the former Mediation Commission Act, where virtually any
strike could be terminated and replaced by compulsory arbitra-
tion, °10 the Code's reach is limited indeed. Even strikes of police,
firemen and hospital workers are not forbidden, although provision
is made for disputes of these groups to be submitted to arbitration
at the union's option.'0 2
The absence of any standing prohibitions against strikes obviously
does not prevent a government from introducing ad hoc legislation
specifically designed to deal with individual emergent situations. But
ad hoc legislation is a dangerous business: it invites politicization of
disputes; it changes the rules in the middle of the game -and is
thus liable to be challenged on grounds of basic fairness; and it does
not afford the parties or the government any long-term basis for
resolution of difficult, structural problems."' Moreover, for a govern-
ment which generally looks to labour for support, reliance upon ad
hoc legislation may simply not be a realistic possibility. This point
was seized upon by an opposition spokesman who pointed out that
during a ferry strike prior to the introduction of the Code, the
government had conceded that it had a gun at its head, that it could
do nothing.1 ' The new Code leaves the government's position
unchanged.
F. Administration of the Collective Agreement
As in other matters, the Code begins with arrangements familiar
to any student of Canadian labour law: collective bargaining is
intended to produce written agreements of at least one year's dura-
tion; 05 during the term of an agreement, the parties are required
100 Id., s. 122(8).
101 Supra, note 97, ss. 18(t), 21(2).
102 The Code, s. 73. The issue of public service strikes was hotly debated. See
DEBATES, supra, note I, at 999-1o9. The government's position was that
although it hoped that most unions would opt for arbitration, the right to
strike was crucial.
203 Arthurs, LABOUR DIsPUTs IN ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES 228-32 (Task Force
on Labour Relations Study No. 8, 1968).
104 P. L. McGeer (Lib., Vancouver-Point Grey), DEBATES, supra, note 1, at 503.
105 The Code, ss. I(1), 65(2) and 66.
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to submit disputes regarding its interpretation or breach to arbitra-
tion;108 and they are forbidden to use economic force so long as the
agreement remains in effect.""7 Like the predecessor Labour Relations
Act, '0 the Code provides for third party intervention, on request, as
a supplement, or an alternative, to arbitration.e1s Like other provin-
cial statutes, the Code provides for ministerial intervention where
the establishment of an arbitration board is frustrated by the failure
of the parties to appoint their nominees, or to agree upon a chair-
man."' And, as did its predecessor,"1' the Code requires that every
collective agreement contain provisions relating to the discipline or
discharge of employees,"' linking this to a long-standing procedural
section authorizing arbitrators to modify disciplinary penalties which
do not meet a "just and reasonable" standard." 8 These sections
make universal and statutory common consensual provisions which
had evolved over the years in the arena of collective bargaining.
But there are important innovations as well. A substantive matter
of potential significance is the treatment of technological change.
Provision for the arbitration of disputes arising out of adjustment to
change must be made in every collective agreement, failing which
the omission may be remedied by ministerial order."' When changes
are made or contemplated which affect the job security or working
conditions of employees, or the basis upon which the agreement was
negotiated, the matter is to be submitted to arbitration. The arbitra-
tor may make a variety of orders including reinstatement and com-
pensation of displaced employees, delay of the change for up to
ninety days, and ultimately, referral to the Labour Relations
Board."' The board, in turn, may require the parties to renegotiate
106 Id., s. 93, 94-
107 Id., s. 79.
108 R.S.B.C. i96o, c. 205, s. 22(4).
109 The Code, s. 96. In lieu of arbitration, the board may either order the
matter to be resolved by an officer, through settlement discussions with the
parties, or to be decided by its own final and conclusive order.
110 Id., s. 95. Cf. Ontario Labour Relations Act, su=pra, note 3, s. 37 (4) ; Mani-
toba Labour Relations Act, id., s. 84(6); see also Saskatchewan Labour
Relations Act, id., s. 26(7), where the Chairman of the board has similar
powers.
"' Labour Relations Act, supra, note xo8, s. 22(1) (a), as amended by S.B.C.
1963, C. 20, S. 3.
112 The Code, s. 93 (1) (a).
113 Id., s. 98, formerly Labour Relations Act, supra, note 1o8, s. 22(5), as
amended by S.B.C. x963, c. 20, s. 3.
14 Id., ss. 74, 75-
"25 Id., s. 76(2).
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their collective agreement, with the possible threat of a strike as a
spur to negotiations." 6 But while these provisions are far-reaching,
they do not exceed those of other Canadian jurisdictions."' If not
"the dullest bill" in relation to technological change, neither is the
Code the most exciting.
As mentioned, the Code continues earlier provisions for third
party intervention in grievance handling. However, it enlarges the
opportunity for such intervention in at least three ways. First,
"[w]here ... delay ... has occurred in settling [a] difference," the
board may expedite arbitration proceedings where the difference is
arbitrable.1" A similar power is vested in the minister when an
arbitrator has failed to issue a decision within a reasonable time."19
Second, whether the matter is arbitrable or not, the board may
request the minister to appoint a special officer,120 a step he may
undertake of his own volition "in the interest of industrial peace"
[w] here there is a dispute, or difference arising out of, or relating to a
collective agreement, or a likelihood of such dispute or difference,
during the term of a collective agreement....22 1
The special officer has plenary power to investigate and decide the
dispute, or to remit it to the grievance machinery at any stage up
to, and including, arbitration.1 22 However, if the "special officer
makes an order on a matter not provided by the collective agree-
ment, or [which] differs from [its] provisions" his order binds for
only thirty days. 2 Third, the parties are offered a subsidy (amount-
ing to one-third of the cost) if they write into their collective agree-
ment a provision that a named third party will speedily investigate
and define differences and make written recommendations to resolve
them.1 24
These measures should help to unclog the grievance machinery,
and allow all claims to flow through legal channels rather than find
116 Id., 3. 77.
117 See, e.g., Canada Labour Code, supra, note 4, ss. 149 et seq.; Manitoba
Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, ss. 72-5; Saskatchewan Trade Union
Act, id., s. 42; Technological Change Rationalization Act, S.S. 1972, c. 133.
11s The Code, s. 97-
19 Id., s. loo.
120 Id., 3. 97.
121 Id., s. 113.
122 Id., s. 114.
123 Id., s. i 16.
124 Id., s. x12.
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illegal expression during the lifetime of the agreement or to burst
forth upon its expiry."' But they may turn out to be mere half-
measures. The special officer's mandate is to investigate disputes
"arising out of, or relating to a collective agreement."'lla How, then,
may he make an order "on a matter not provided by the collective
agreement or ... [which] differs from [its] provisions"5?12b And is
he to be expected to indicate that his order is of that type, hence
limited in effectiveness to a thirty day period? And in any event,
will not all orders be subject to challenge as being, essentially, non-
arbitrable or as not "arising out of, or relating to" an agreement?
Finally, it should be noted that the special officer is not shielded by
a privative clause, as is the Labour Relations Board,128 but is subject
to appellate court review, as are arbitration boards.12 Accordingly,
the prospect is for delays, legalism, fine interpretations, court chal-
lenge, and ultimately paralysis -the very syndrome afflicting the
arbitration system and requiring the creation of the "special officer"
device.
Turning, then, to the risks of legalism,"as the Code makes a very
modest effort to mitigate the worst effects of court review. What it
does not do is to oust review altogether; rather the approach is to
regularize it and to define its limits.
In general terms, the Arbitration Act" is made applicable to
labour arbitration, with certain modifications." A stated case pro-
cedure is put in place,' presumably to expedite the decision of legal
questions. However, this procedure suffers from at least three defects:
125 This was clearly the hope of the government:
[Olne of the greatest and most sensitive problem areas has been disputes
arising during the course of collective agreements. It's manifested through
job actions, work-to-rule programmes, work stoppages, wildcat strikes, and
so on.... [Section 97] allows the board to become involved at an earlier
stage and to offer aids that will pre-empt the necessity for taking this kind
of guerilla action and inflaming the whole industrial climate of the
provnce....
Hon. W. S. King, DEBATs, supra, note i, at 398.
125a The Code, s. 113.
325b Id., s. i16.
128 See, infra, Part III B, The Board's Powers and the Prospects for Judicial
Review.
"22 The Code, ss. 207-o9 and i2iA.
128 See generally Weiler, The "Slippery Slope" of Judicial Intervention (x97')
9 OsOoovE HALL L.J.x; Adams, Grievance Arbitration and Judicial Review
in North America, id., 443.
129 The Code, s. xo6.
180 Id.
131 Id., s. 107.
VOL. 9
LABOUR CODE
it affords an opportunity for delay; it invites the interpretation of
contractual language divorced from the factual environment of the
case; and it permits the courts to mould arbitral jurisprudence by
in terrorem rulings.
So far as review per se is concerned, the Code does little to reas-
sure those concerned with establishing or preserving the integrity of
the arbitration process. The Court of Appeal, it is true, is given
"exclusive jurisdiction in all arbitration cases" '132 and to this extent
some degree of predictability and consistency in the law of judicial
review can be expected to emerge. But the substantive grounds for
review are virtually open-ended: misbehaviour of the arbitrator,
error of law affecting jurisdiction, and denial of natural justice."'
"Misbehaviour", when juxtaposed with the reference to natural
justice, can only refer to some technical error such as the reception
of inadmissible evidence. No protection is likely to be afforded the
arbitrator in such a case by his statutory mandate "to receive and
accept such evidence.., as in [his] discretion [he] considers proper,
whether or not the evidence is admissible in a court of law."'" The
prognosis must be for repeated appeals to the court against relatively
minor arbitral departures from familiar procedural and evidentiary
rules in the direction of greater informality and flexibility. There is,
of course, no desire to license such departures where fundamental
violations of natural justice occur, but the experience to date is that
such violations have been relatively rare.13 5
The notion that limiting review to "error of law affecting juris-
diction" inhibits a full exploration of all legal issues, can only be
described as naive. The ease with which virtually any issue can be
translated into a jurisdictional issue has been the subject of rueful
132 Id., s. io8, subject to ss. 96 and 107, which provide, respectively, for
enforcement of awards and for the decision of stated cases, upon reference
by the board, by the Supreme Court.
138 Id., s. io8(i)(a)-(c).
134 Id., s. xoi (a). See R. v. Barber, Ex parte Warehousemen and Miscellaneous
Drivers' Union, Local 4Y9 (x967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 387 (ONT. H.C.), aff'd.
(1968) 68 D.L.R. (2d) 682 (ONT. C.A.).
135 But see, e.g., Reference Re Building Material, Construction & Fuel Truck
Drivers Union, Local 213, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-feurs. Warehousemen and Helpers and United Cartage Co. Ltd. (1956) 4
D.L.R. (2d) 98 (B.C.S.C.); Westeel Products Ltd. v. U.S.W.A. (1964) 65
C.L.L.C., para. 14,044 (B.C.S.C.); Re Bradley and Ottawa Professional Fire
Fighters Assoc. [1967] 2 O.R. 311 (C.A.) ; Re Hoogendoorn and Greening
Metal Products & Screenings Equip. Co. et al. (1968) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641(S.C.C.); R. v. Fine et al., Ex parte Sheraton Ltd. [z968] 2 0R. 490(ONT. H.C.); R. v. Board of Arbitration, Ex parte Cumberland Railway
Co. (1968) 67 D.L.R. (2d) x35 (N.S.C.A. ; R. v. Moore, Ex parte Brooks
(1969) 6 D.L.R. (3d) 465 (ONT. H.C.).
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observation for at least twenty years."' And the draughtsmen of the
Labour Code recognize this: vide their elaborate efforts to protect
the Labour Relations Board itself from review, even on jurisdictional
grounds.1 87
Why, then, are arbitrators afforded so little shelter from the stormy
blasts of judicial review? A variety of possible answers may be sug-
gested. Unlike the Labour Relations Board, whose membership is
carefully selected and almost certain to be of high quality, the ranks
of arbitrators are open to anyone agreeable to the parties. Hence
arbitrators are more likely to be variable in skill and experience, to
say nothing of legal knowledge. The parties themselves are involved
more frequently and more closely with arbitration than with labour
relations board proceedings, the public visibility of arbitral awards
is lower, and the adverse effects of either awards or judicial decisions
can always be undone at the next set of negotiations. For all these
reasons, it might be argued that there is little at stake here for a
government that seems otherwise committed to the notion of exclud-
ing judicial review. But the result of the legislation may well be that
review of arbitral awards is the major remaining judicial role in
labour relations matters. And review, whatever else it means, means
cost, delay and legalism, none of which will make arbitration a more
useful instrument in resolving labour-management differences.
So far as protection against "denial of natural justice" is restricted
to genuine cases of abuse, there is no possible objection to judicial
review. The difficulty is to identify such abuse in the peculiar context
of labour relations. Two important illustrations have emerged in
recent years: the degree of impartiality required of the parties'
nominees to tripartite arbitration boards,' and the right of indi-
vidual employees to intervene in arbitration proceedings if they are
1ss Lasldn, Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Private
Clauses (1952) CAN. B. REv. 986; Weiler, supra, note 828; Hogg, The
Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law (1973) xI OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 187. And see Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. v. Arthurs et al.
(x968) 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.); Bell Canada v. Office and Profes-
sional Employees' International Union, Local 53z (1973) 37 D.L.R. (3 d)
561 (S.C.C.).
187 The Code, supra, note 2, ss. 3S , 33, 34; see infra, Part III B, The Board's
Powers and the Prospects for Judicial Review.
138 See Arthurs, The Three Faces of Justice: Bias in the Tripartite Tribunal
(z963) 28 SASK. L. REv. 147; Canadian Airline Pilots' Association v. Cana-
dian Pacific Airlines et al. (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 417 (B.C.C.A.); Re
Carnation Foods Co. Ltd. & Canadian Food and Allied Workers, Local 798
et al. (1972) 28 D.L.R. ( 3d) 584 (MAN. C.A.); Re Canadian Shipbuilding
& Engineering Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America [x973] 3 O.R.
240 (Dxv. CT.), lv. to app. denied ['9741 x O.R. (2d) 44x (C.A.).
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adverse in interest to the union.'" The Code deals with neither
problem.
However, the Code does not entirely abandon arbitration to the
status quo. Indeed, by several constructive measures, it may well do
a great deal to enhance the quality and usefulness of the process.
The minister is given a mandate 4 ° to make administrative arrange-
ments for the conduct of arbitrations, to train and educate arbitra-
tors, to conduct research and publish information about arbitration,
and to maintain a register of arbitrators, all of which will presum-
ably enhance the numbers and quality of available arbitrators, and
make them more accessible to the parties.
Finally, as has been noted,"" the Code retains provisions of the
former statute142 by which the labour board is empowered to decide
disputes which would otherwise be arbitrated. These provisions have
been used rather frequently, especially in smaller bargaining units,
and the possibility exists of transferring the whole burden of adjudi-
cation from arbitrators to the board itself. The board may well
cooperate in such a development, if the parties wish it. But some
major unions and employers still seem to prefer the control they
have traditionally exercised over the machinery of arbitration, to
the obvious financial advantages of labour board adjudication.
G. The Rules of Economic Conflict4
In its articulation of the rules of economic conflict, the Code shows
the unmistakeable influence of two rather unlikely progenitors -
the British Columbia Trade-unions Act of x959,14" and the Rand
Report of 1968."'3
The Trade-unions Act'- denounced and reviled by the labour
movement and the C.C.F./N.D.P. opposition through the i96o's,
and repealed by the N.D.P. government in 1973 - was nonetheess
the first significant Canadian statute to define the limits of lawful
139 Re Hoogendoorn, supra, note 135. See also, Ferguson, Comment (x968) 6
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113; Rossman, Comment (x968) 26 U.T. FACULTY
L. REv. i; Paliare, Tilting Against the Windmill: The Individual's Right to
Arbitration (1970) 8 0sGoODE HALL L.J. 485.
140 The Code, s. i i z.
141 Supra, note log.
142 Supra, note io8.
141 Part V of the Code (ss. 79-91) dealing with economic conflict, has not been
proclaimed in force as of the date of writing (June 1974).
244 S.B.C. i959, c. 90, latterly R.S.B.C. 196o, c. 384, repealed by the Code, s.
151.
245 Supra, note 5.
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strikes and picketing. Its basic approach of permitting peaceful
picketing only at an employer's business premises and during a law-
ful strike remains at the core of the new statute. 4 However, the
Code does make explicit a number of exceptions to this rather
draconian approach which over the years were either accepted by
the courts, or advocated unsuccessfully by litigants, academic critics
or other legislative reformers.
The Rand Report was greeted with roughly the same enthusiasm
by labour unions and N.D.P. supporters as was the Trade-unions
Act. Two pro-labour, pro-N.D.P. commentators were particularly
scathing in their denunciation of Justice Rand's attempt to "scrap"
the system of free collective bargaining and replace it with "the arbi-
trary fiats of an all-powerful tribunal,"' 47 and of his proposal for "a
massive derogation of common law with an administrative super-
vision of labour relations.... "" Yet, in broad terms, this is the
direction in which the new Code turns. The Rand Report recom-
mended that almost limitless power be given to an Industrial Tri-
bunal to tailor the general rules of economic conflict to the particular
power-balance of individual strikes. 4 The Labour Code, in rather
more limited fashion, gives analogous powers to the Labour Rela-
tions Board.' And if a difference in degree amounts to a difference
in kind, the fact remains that the Rand Report was the first to adopt
this approach to regulating economic conflict.
As noted, the Code relies upon the Labour Relations Board and
legislatively established rules of conflict rather than upon the courts
and judge-made, common law rules. This general approach is amply
supported not simply by the precedent of the Trade-unions Act, but
as well by academic criticism of the tort doctrines,'.. and by the
findings of the federal Task Force,"' to say nothing of the Rand
Report.' In the legislative debates on the Code, not one member
146 Trade-unions Act, supra, note 144, s. 3; the Code, ss. s (x), 85.
247 Fisher and Crowe, The Unreal Rand (September ig, 1968) Toronto Tele-
gram.
148 Fisher and Crowe, Rand's Monolith (September 2o, z968) Toronto Tele-
gram.
149 Supra, note 5, Recommendations 1, 4, 11-25, 36, 48, and 52.
150 The Code, ss. 28, 29, 77, 85(1) (b), 86, and gi.
'5 Arthurs, Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judicial
Workmanship (Ig6o) 38 CAN. B. REV. 346; Christie, THE LIABILITY OF
STRIKERS IN THE LAW OF TORT (1967); Carrothers, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING LAW IN CANADA (1965) ch. 26, The Substantive Law of Picketing and
Boycotting.
152 Supra, note 6, at 130-33.
153 Supra, note 5, at 64-5 and Recommendation 38, at 96.
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of any party sought to preserve, or even clarify, the role of the courts
as primary agencies in regulating strikes and picketing. 4
Unlike the Trade-unions Act, which merely established new statu-
tory causes of action to be pursued in the courts, and did not abolish
common law proceedings, 55 the Labour Code provides specifically
that the board
... has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction ... in respect of ...
(b) any application for the restraint or prohibition of any person or
group of persons from
(i) ceasing, or refusing, to perform work, or to remain in a relation-
ship of employment; or
(ii) picketing, striking, or locking out; or
(iii) communicating information or opinion in a labour dispute by
speech, writing, or any other means of communication. 56
To bolster this provision, it is made clear that "no court has or shall
exercise any jurisdiction" in respect of any of the prohibitions in the
Act against illegal strikes or picketing, or of any of the activities
enumerated in the language quoted above, with specific reference
("without restricting the generality of the foregoing") to the issuance
of injunctions.157 To this total prohibition of judicial intervention, a
sole specific exception is made: the need to avoid "an immediate
and serious danger to life or health", 5 ' although even then ex parte
injunctions are specifically prohibited. "
The constitutionality of these and other provisions will be can-
vassed in another section of this article. Of immediate concern is
their efficacy. Following the precedent of the U.S. Norris-La Guardia
Act, 6 ' the Code for the most part adopts the device of depriving
the courts of jurisdiction, rather than that of abolishing causes of
action or immunizing parties to industrial disputes from their appli-
cation, as did the British Trade Disputes Act of 19o6... and, for
154 The only opposition query on this point related to the right of a landowner
to recover damages for actual physical injury to his property by trespassing
pickets; G. B. Gardom (Lib., Vancouver-Point Grey), DEBATES, supra, note
I, at 1034-o36; discussed, infra.
255 See, e.g., Perini Pacific Ltd. v. International Union of Operating Engineers
Local z15 et al. (x961) 36 W.W.R. 49 (B.C.S.C.).
156 The Code, s. 31(1).
157 Id., s. 31(2).
25 Id., s. 31(3).
259 Id., s. 32.
160 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
161 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 (U.K.).
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that matter, the British Columbia Trade Disputes Act of i9o2.8 '
However, in at least three areas, the latter approach was adopted.
Canying forward a provision of the 1959 Trade-unions Act,...
the new Code provides:
Any act done by two or more persons acting by agreement or combina-
tion, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a labour dispute, is not
actionable, unless the act would be wrongful without any agreement or
combination.16 4
But the term "labour dispute" was not broadly defined in the 1959
Trade-unions Act,' and there is a similarly narrow definition of
the term "dispute",8 simpliciter, in the Code, which appears to
envisage a proximate employer-employee relationship. Thus, acts
done by third parties which amount to civil conspiracies, and are not
those in respect of which a court is specifically deprived of jurisdic-
tion,' might still be the subject of a civil action. For example, two
trade unionists may conspire to procure a boycott of a non-union
employer by means other than "ceasing, or refusing, to perform
work, ... picketing, striking, ... or communicating information or
opinion in a labour dispute...." Keeping in mind the possibly
limited definition of the latter phrase, they might well find themselves
liable for damages in a common law conspiracy action. Whether
boycotts should be totally protected, or protected only in limited
circumstances, or protected at all, is a matter for legitimate debate.
But the statute might be clearer than it is about who is to make that
decision. 6
8
Other language in the Code poses similar difficulties:
No action lies in respect of picketing permitted under this Act for
(a) trespass to real property to which a member of the public ordinarily
has access; or
(b) interference with contractual relations.'6
There is relatively little risk that the courts will become involved in
162 S.B.C. 19o2, c. 66. See Carrothers, The British Columbia Trade-Unions
Act, z959 (ig6o) 38 CAN. B. REV. 295.
163 Supra, note 144, s. 5.
164 The Code, s. 89.
165 Supra, note 144, s. 2.
166 The Code, s. 1 (1).
167 See, supra, notes 57-59.
168 The permissible limits of "information" which may be disseminated by a
union are set out in the Code, s. 84, and discussed infra.
269 Id., s. 87.
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defining what is "picketing permitted under this Act," despite an
implicit assumption that actions may be brought in respect of non-
permitted picketing. The language quoted earlier does appear to
consign that task entirely to the Labour Relations Board. However,
there still remains the problem of torts committed in the course of
permitted picketing. How are these to be dealt with by the courts?
An exchange between the Minister of Labour and a leading
opposition critic is illuminating in this regard. Responding to an
opposition amendment designed to make pickets liable "for all spe-
cial damages occasioned and proven," i.e. for actual physical damage
such as "broken windows or torn fences or ripped partitions," 17 the
Minister stated:
... I have no argument with ... the intent [of the amendment] here,
but I do submit that the section does not insulate any person from acts
of violence or acts of negligence.... [T]hat damage would be based
either upon negligence or criminal intent or something of that nature,
and there is nothing in this Act which seeks to prohibit actions in the
civil or criminal courts for such situations.
If [the member] can indicate to me any section of this act which with-
draws a citizen's recourse to the courts for that type of situation, then
I certainly would be receptive to the amendment. But I submit that that
is not the case, Mr. Chairman. 1
Assuming that the Minister accurately reflects the intention of the
government, it should be noted that the logic of his position is that
any tort committed in the course of picketing - defamation, assault,
even intimidation (in the sense of a threat to break a contract)"'
- may be actionable unless (presumably) it is specifically precluded
by the Code." 8 At least in the case of the first two torts mentioned,
the Minister's position is consistent with the recommendation of the
federal Task Force that the "how" of picketing alone remain subject
to common law doctrine and judicial control. 4 But there are two
difficulties with the Minister's position, one practical, the other
interpretative.
The practical difficulty is that in the course of deciding, for
example, that messages disseminated by the pickets are defamatory,
or that their behaviour constitutes an assault, the court is really
170 G. B. Gardom, supra, note 154, at 1035.
171 Id., at 1035-036.
172 Cf., Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 2129 CH.L.).
273 The Code deals specificially with trespass (3. 87(a)), interference with con-
tractual relations (s. 87(b)), and civil conspiracy (s. 89).
174 Supra, note 6, Recommendation 622, at ,8o.
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determining the efficacy of the picketing. "Defamation" may consist
merely in a failure adequately to disclose that the primary locus of
the dispute is at another of the employer's business premises.""
"Assault" may consist merely in "pointing, grimacing and star-
ing."176 And in determining that the tort of coercion has been com-
mitted, the court may well be defining the legitimate ambit of pres-
sure available to a union seeking to enforce its collective agree-
ment. 7  By the astute selection of a cause of action (if the Minister
is right) the employer may bypass the whole integrated body of
statutory rules administered by the Labour Relations Board.
The more important difficulty with the Minister's view is that it
does not appear consistent with a fair interpretation of section 31,
quoted earlier, which gives the board "exclusive jurisdiction in
respect of ... picketing, striking ... ," and denies the court "any
jurisdiction in respect of a matter" consigned to the board. It would
be difficult to resist the conclusion that these words were intended
to give the board plenary power to regulate picketing, except that
it has no mandate in regard to the "how" of such activity.
The escape from this latter difficulty, if any, lies only in the direc-
tion of defining picketing. The Code is of some assistance in this
exercise:
"[P]icket" or "picketing" means watching and besetting, or attending
at or near an employer's place of business, operations, or employment
for the purpose of persuading or attempting to persuade anyone not to
(i) enter that employer's place of business, operations, or employment;
or
(ii) deal in or handle the products of that employer; or
(iii) do business with that employer,
and any similar act at such place that has an equivalent purpose. 78
This definition does not expressly embrace the use of violence,
defamation, or economic threats and such activities are therefore
presumably not "picketing". But if they are not, the first practical
problem must again be considered: the courts may be left with a
175 F. W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. v. Retail Food and Drug Clerks Union, Local
z518 (1962) 30 D.L.R. (2d) 377 (B.C.S.C.).
176 Hammer v. Kemmis (x956) 18 W.W.R. 673 (B.C.S.C.) at 677, aff'd.
(1956) 20 W.W.R. 619 (B.C.C.A.).
177 Supra, note 172. The counterpart Canadian case, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Local 213 v. Therien [196o] S.C.R. 265, was framed in terms
of "wrongful interference with the plaintiff's business", a tort only arguably
preempted by the Code's prohibition of action "for interference with con-
tractual relations": the Code, s. 87(b).
178 The Code, s. i (z).
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major role in defining the permissible limits of economic conflict.
Keeping in mind, then, that the common law may be alive and
well, notwithstanding the apparent contrary intention of the
draughtsmen, what are the ground rules of industrial conflict as the
statute envisages them?
As noted, the basic rules for picketing are that it must be persua-
sive, in support of a lawful strike, and at the employer's place of
business.1
9
That picketing must be intended to persuade is clear from the
statutory definition already quoted. That some degree of physical
activity is contemplated also seems clear from the juxtaposition of
"watching and besetting" - implying movement, with "attending"
- implying a more passive presence. The definition includes "any
similar act ... that has an equivalent purpose," but the scope of
this phrase can only be understood when it is contrasted with a
general right of communication guaranteed by the Code:
A trade union ... may, at any time and in any manner that does not
constitute picketing as the word is defined in this Act, communicate
information to any person, or publicly express sympathy or support for
any person, as to matters or things affecting ... terms or conditions of
employment or work done or to be done by that person. 80
This distinction between communication and picketing is further
evidence of an expectation that pickets will do something more than
merely inform. The question is how much more they will be per-
mitted to do. At a minimum, they will attend and persuade; at a
maximum, they will watch, beset and do similar acts in order to
persuade. But it will still be necessary to decide whether particular
conduct should be characterized as persuasion, or as something so
much more than persuasion that it is different from persuasion, and
hence not "picketing." For example, mass picketing, raucous heck-
ling, brief or extended blockage of pedestrian or vehicular traffic
are not unknown. All are no doubt intended to persuade. But will
the Labour Relations Board (or the court exercising a vestigial
jurisdiction in tort) begin to hold that such conduct is illegal
"non-picketing" because of its superadded nonpersuasive features?
And, if so, where will the lines be drawn? Must persuasion be
"rational?"""1 Must it be undertaken through polite, verbal appeals
179 Id., ss. z, 85.
180 Id., s. 84 [emphasis added].
181 Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants (1947) Ltd. [1951] S.C.R. 762, per
Rand J., at 784.
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rather than through the dramatic demonstration of solidarity by the
appearance of strikers in large numbers? And if actual violence
clearly lies beyond the pale, how will it be suppressed while preserv-
ing residual persuasive elements? These are difficult issues, and their
solution will be one of the most controversial aspects of the operation
of the Code.
However, it does seem clear that the right of communication
already quoted, and other provisions relating to the permissible situs
of picketing, discussed below, may well spell the end of judicial
stigmatization of picketing which is "excessive" because it is
secondary. 8'
The lawfulness of a strike continues to be an essential precon-
dition of. the lawfulness of picketing."" Strikes, in turn, are legal
only after the parties have pursued their negotiations to an
impasse, and either a secret-ballot strike vote has been conducted or
the employer has announced he is going to lock out his employees."8 4
During the relatively short period provided for mediation,8" the
right to strike is postponed. All of these provisions essentially con-
form to the prevailing pattern of Canadian labour legislation,
including the former British Columbia statute. 8 Only in relation
to the right of public communication by means other than picketing
does the Code depart from former provincial policy and even here
it is anticipated by legislation in other provinces,"' as well as by
libertarian judicial pronouncements."'
In relation to the ambit of lawful picketing, however, the Code
is considerably ciearer than previous legislation, and somewhat more
182 Arthurs, Comment (1963) 41 CAN. B. Rnv. 573; Carrothers, Secondary
Picketing (1962) 40 CAN. B. REV. 57; Paterson, Union Secondary Conduct:
A Comparative Study of the American and Ontario Positions (1973) 8
U.B.C. L. Rav. 77; Beatty, Secondary Boycotts: A Functional Analysis
(1974) 54 CAN. B. REv. 388.
183 Cf. Trade-unions Act, 1959, supra, note 144, s. 3-
184 The Code, s. 8o.
185 Supra, notes 86-8.
186 See generally, Arthurs, The Right to Strike in Ontario and the Common
Law Provinces of Canada (1966) 4 COL. I. DR. COMP. 187.
187 Court of Queen's Bench Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-28o, s. 6o-2, am. by S.M.
1970, c. 79, s. 2; Industrial Relations Act, S.N.B. 1971, c. 9, s. 105(3);
Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1970, C. 191, s. 53(3)-
188 Koss v. Konn (x96i) 3o D.L.R. (2d) 242 (B.C.C.A.), per Norris J.A.,
dissenting; Channel Seven Television Ltd. v. N.A.B.E.T. [I971] 5 W.W.R.
328 (MAN. C.A.), per Hall J.A.; Peerless Laundry and Cleaners Ltd. v.
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Union [1952] 4 D.L.R. 475 (MAN.




permissive. Avoiding the semantic trap of Koss v. Konn,89 the new
Code cannot possibly be read as applying to pickets outside the
labour relations arena; its restrictions are directed to "any matter or
dispute to which this Act applies." 190 Thus, the activity of consumer
organizations, for example, seems to be safe from any contraints
imposed by the Code on picketing. 91
So far as the situs of picketing is concerned, an interpretative gloss
on the former Trade-unions Act had already extended the right of a
union to picket in locations other than the employer's primary place
of business. The courts had held that a union could picket any one
of the employer's operations,192 at least where no new corporate
entity was interposed,19 even where the employer was present only
temporarily (though not transitorily), ' or in company with other
employers. 9 These extended rights of picketing are now more clearly
articulated, although they are sensibly qualified by a proviso giving
the board power to prohibit such picketing where it might lead to
the breach of an existing collective agreement. 9 Less clear under
the old statute was the right of a union to picket firms allied with
the struck employer, although some case law suggested that such a
28 Supra, note z88.
190 The Code, s. 88.
191 Cf., Slade and Stewart Ltd. v. Haynes (x969) 5 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 736
(B.C.C.A.).
'192 Taylor, Pearson & Carson (B.C.) Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale & Department
Store Union, Local 535 (1961) 30 D.L.R. (2d) 367 (B.C.S.C.); Crestbrook
Forest Industries Ltd. v. I.W.A. (1967) 68 C.L.L.C., para. 14,093
(B.C.S.C.); J. H. McRae Co. Ltd. v. I.B.E.W. Local 2z3 (1969) 4 D.L.R.
(3d) 178 (B.C.S.C.).
193 White Lunch Ltd. v. Nielson (1962) 63 C.L.L.C., para. 25,453 (B.C.S.C.);
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. O.C.A.W. (x969) 69 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.S.C.), appeal
dismissed, (x969) 69 W.W.R. 702 (B.C.C.A.).
194 See, e.g., B.C. Radio Cabs Ltd. v. Vancouver and District Taxi-Cab Drivers
Union (2964) 43 D.L.R. (2d) 292 (B.C.S.C.); U.S. Borax & Chemical
Corp. v. Retail Wholesale & Dept. Store Union (2967) 68 C.L.L.C., para.
4,073 (B.C.S.C.); Machilan Bloedel Ltd. v. IB.P.S.P.M.W., Local 76
(2970) 70 O.L.L.C., para. 14,048 (B.C.S.C.) ; but c. Williams v. Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters et al. (x963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 885 (B.C.S..); Gesco
Distributing Ltd. v. General Warehousemen and Manufacturing Employees
Union, Local 842 et al. (2969) 7! W.W.R. 449 (B.C.S.C.); Seaboard
Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Merchant ,rvice Guild et ci. (1970) 14
D.L.R. ( 3d) 266 (B.C.S.C.).
192 Pacific Coast Terminals Co. Ltd. v. I.L.U. (960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) 249
(B.C.C.A.); Gadicke Construction Ltd. v. C.U.P.E. (x966) 66 C.L.L.C.,
para. 24,242 (B.C.S.C.); Greenlees Pile-driving Co. Ltd. v. I.B.E.W. (1969)
4 D.L.R. (3d) 335 (B.C.S.C.) ; Seaboard Advertising Co. Ltd. v. Sheet Metal
Workers International Association (1971) 71 C.L.L.C., para. 14,091
(B.C.S.C.).
198 The Code, s. 85 (1) (b).
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right might exist."' The new Code makes the right explicit; an
"ally" is a fair target for picketing.'98
The Code also makes explicit the right to picket on the public
areas of shopping centres and other "property to which a member
of the public ordinarily has access,"' 99 a conclusion towards which
some provincial courts were already groping."' However, the Code
does so by precluding an action for trespass, which would presum-
ably be brought by the owner of the land, while saying nothing
about the right of a struck employer-tenant to sue for interference
with his easement over sidewalks or parking lots adjacent to his
premises within the shopping centre. Moreover, the section would
appear to be so broadly drawn as to permit picketing within the
public areas of a retail store or office building, at least insofar as the
owner is prevented from suing for trespass. There seems little justifi-
cation for such an extended right of access, since in most cases there
will be a suitable location for picketing on adjacent streets, or
"quasi-public" areas.
In relation to the right to strike, per se, the Code is rather surpris-
ing, more because of what it does not provide, than because of what
it does. The trend of Canadian legislation has been to ensure some
form of security for striking employes which will render them less
vulnerable to employer pressure. Virtually all of our labour laws
(including that of British Columbia)2 '" purport to preserve the
employment relationship during a strike. In R. v. Canadian Pacific
Railway Co.' (the Royal York Hotel case), however, the em-
ployer's attempt to discharge strikers was also held to be an unfair
197 Becker Constr. Co. Ltd. v. United Association of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry (1959) r5 D.L.R. (2d)
354 (B.C.C.A.); U.S. Borax, supra, note 194. See also Refrigeration Supplies
Co. Ltd. v. Ellis (1970) 14 D.L.R. (3d) 682 (ONT. H.C.) for a review of
the cases.
198 The Code, s. 85(1) (c). The definition of an "ally" is provided by ss. 85(2)
and (3).
19 Id., s. 87 (a).
200 See Arthurs, Comment (z965) 43 CAN. B. Rav. 357 and cases cited therein;
but see contra R. v. Page [29631 1 C.C.C. 293 (ONT. H.C.); R. v. Peters
(i969) 68 C.L.L.C. para. 14,218 (ONT. PRaov. CT.), rev'd. (1971) x6
D.L.R. ( 3d) 143 (ONT. C.A.), aff'd. (197x) 17 D.L.R. (3d) x28 (S.C.C.).See also Harrison v. Carswell [x974] 4 W.W.R. 394 (MAN. C.A.).
201 The Code, s. 1(2). Note that this protection is afforded only to employees
who are involved in legal strikes. Cf., Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra,
note 3, s. 1(2), which contains no such limitation; Praesto Aluminum
Products Ltd. (1959) 59 C.L.L.C., para. 16,237 (O.L.R.B.).
202 (2962) 3 D.L.R. (2d) 209 (ONT. H.0.), aff'd. (x962) 33 D.L.R. (2d)
30 (ONT. C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Zambri
(1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 (S.C.C.).
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labour practice because it was aimed at employees who were "exer-
cising ... rights under the Acte"2 " to "participate in [the] lawful
activities"'2 " of a union, specifically, striking.
No such clear statutory basis exists in the new Code for prevent-
ing an employer from discharging strikers. Discharge is forbidden
only where it is aimed at union membership per se,2' 0 rather than at
other "lawful activities." Indeed, the only references to such activities
reinforce this point. There is a specific prohibition against attempts
to restrain the exercise of rights under the Act by the imposition of
conditions in a contract of employment."" This provision obviously
cannot apply where employment has been terminated. Second,
another provision forbids interference "with lawful concerted action"
but only where such action is "for the purpose of obtaining collective
representation." 207 It would prove of little assistance to employees
engaged in a conventional strike for higher wages.
On the other hand, the Code does contemplate that workers who
have formed unions will use those unions for collective bargaining
purposes, that in aid of collective bargaining such unions may call
strikes, and that workers may participate in strikes called by their
unions. It can be argued, then, that the statutory prohibition against
discharge for union membership0 ' extends to discharge which has
the effect of rendering such membership nugatory by punishing
workers who participate in an activity which is a necessary incident
of membership. Alternatively, it can be argued that if an employer
confronts an employee with the choice of defecting from the strike
or forfeiting his employment, he has thereby "impose[d] [a] condi-
tion in a contract of employment seeking to restrain an employee
from exercising his rights under this Act. '2" As in the Royal York
Hotel case, the right in question is the right "to participate in [the
union's] lawful activities."21 0
Even assuming that these latter arguments prevail, at best the new
Code virtually replicates the former legislation,21 and does little to
208 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 58(a).
204 Id., s. 3; cf. the Code, s. 2.
205 The Code, s. 3(2) (a).
206 Id., s. 3(2) (b).
207 Id., s. 3(2) (f).
208 Id., s. 3(2) (a).
209 Id., s. 3(2) (b).
210 Id., S. 2.
221 Supra, note 1o8, s. 4(2).
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make the position of the striker more secure. This is particularly
surprising since recent legislative changes in other Canadian jurisdic-
tions have tended to enhance the position of strikers. For example,
recent enactments have prohibited employers from cancelling vari-
ous employment-related benefits such as pensions, 21 - or have required
employers to permit strikers to return to work either absolutely,21 or
within a fixed period of time following the commencement of the
strike.1 The new Code contains no such provisions.
Instead, it makes the relatively innocuous gesture of prohibiting
the use of professional strike breakers,"" while leaving undisturbed
the employer's historic right to hire replacements "off the street." 28
The gesture, of course, can only fairly be termed "innocuous" in
those situations where the employer cannot effectively recruit strike-
breakers "off the street" because the workforce is too large to be
replaced on the local labour market, because the employees are too
highly skilled to be replaced, or because the union's organization of
the potential pool of replacements effectively rules out such a possi-
bility. But where a small, weak group of unskilled employees is on
strike, the use of professional strikebreakers is a potentially important
weapon for the employer, and the prohibition of its use should help
to maintain a more nearly equal balance of power between the
parties. In so doing, it may help to dampen down the frequently
incendiary atmosphere of such strikes, and thus promote generally
a more temperate climate of labour relations in the province.
Finally, mention must be made of a provision whose terms are
capable (on one possible interpretation) of rather far-reaching
consequences:
Except as otherwise agreed in writing ... where the [strike] vote is in
favour of a strike,(a) no person shall declare or authorize a strike, and no employee shall
strike, except during the three months immediately following the
date on which the vote was taken; ...217
The italicized language, read in isolation from the balance of the
section, might give rise to the inference that strikes must either be
212 Manitoba Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 14(0) (a); Canada Labour
Code, supra, note 4, s. 184(3) (d).
213 Manitoba Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. I x.
214 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 64.
215 The Code, s. 3(2)(c). The term "professional strike breaker" is defined in
S. 1(1).
216 Hon. W. S. King, DEBATES, supra, note x, at 1033.
217 The Code, s. 8 (2) [emphasis added].
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terminated within three months or renewed by the holding of a new
vote. However, this reading seems strained for several reasons. First,
an important policy decision to limit strikes to a three month period
is hardly likely to be buried in a section dealing with strike votes.
Second, such a limitation would have to be coupled with some state-
ment as to the consequences of terminating the strike; no such state-
ment is provided. Third, the opening words of the subsection - "no
person shall declare or authorize a strike .. ." - envisage that the
strike has not yet begun. Consequently, the parallel clause - "no
employee shall strike" - should also be read as if the strike has not
yet begun; in effect it should be read as "no employee shall go on
strike." This interpretation, it is submitted, is more consistent with
both the intent and the textual setting than the far-reaching inter-
pretation initially proffered.
H. Individual Rights and Union Power
Irony is the leitmotif of the provisions of the Code dealing with
the position of individual employees vis-a-vis labour unions. Irony:
because unions were originally meant to protect individuals from the
power of their employer and now, it is said, they themselves hold
individuals powerless in their grip. Irony: because few governments
in the country have gone as far as that of British Columbia to protect
individuals from potential abuse of the power of unions, yet its
efforts to do so evoked more criticism from the opposition than
almost any provision of the Code. Irony: because few segments of
the Canadian labour movement have been more committed to
political action than that of British Columbia, but having helped to
elect an N.D.P. government, few find their internal affairs subject
to closer public scrutiny.
Quite conventionally, the Code gives a union holding bargaining
rights the exclusive authority to bargain collectively for employees in
the bargaining unit, and to bind them by a collective agreement."1
This right carries with it the possibility that union membership may
become a condition of employment, if the employer agrees to incor-
porate such a provision in the collective agreement. 219 Both the
exclusivity principle and union security clauses derogate from the
absolute freedom of individuals to participate in, or support, other
218 Id., s. 46(a).
219 Id., s. 9. In the absence of such a provision, an employee may nonetheless
require an employer to honour a written assignment of his wages to the
union for dues, subject to cancellation of such assignment by him or by the
labour board, s. zo.
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unions or no union, even though the Code appears at first glance to
guarantee the freedom to join a union,"' and to prohibit
... coercion or intimidation of any kind that could reasonably have the
effect of compelling or inducing any person to become or refrain from
becoming, or to continue or to cease to be, a member of a trade
union.2
21
The issues of whether union security arrangements should be per-
mitted, or to what extent, of whether inter-union disputes should be
more closely regulated by law, and of whether the internal affairs of
trade unions should be matters for self-government, are all too com-
plex for satisfactory resolution in this note.22 Suffice it to say that
there is widespread acceptance of the notion that union power carries
reciprocal responsibilities owed to the individuals on whose behalf
it is meant to be exercised. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated:
[A] union has, as a result of certification, ceased to be a purely volun-
tary association of individuals. It has become a legal entity, with the
status of a bargaining agent for a group of employees, all of whom are
thereby brought into association with it, whether as members, or as
persons whom it can bind by a collective agreement, even though not
members. It must, as their agent, deal with the members of the group
which it represents equitably 223
This notion has begun to be reflected in such statutory admoni-
tions as the new Code contains, requiring unions not to represent
employees "in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith," regardless of union membership.2 4 In British Columbia, this
so-called duty of fair representation may be enforced through con-
ventional administrative remedies available for redress against any
unfair labour practice.22
220 Id., S. 2.
221 Id., s. 5.
222 See generally, Palmer, RESPONSIBLE DECISION-MAKING IN DEMocRATic
UNIONS, (Task Force on Labour Relations Study No. II, 2969).
223 Imperial Oil v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers [1963] S.C.R. 584, at
593 per Martland, J.
224 The Code, s. 7(); cf. Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 6o.
See generally, Carr, Development of the Duty of Fair Representation in
Ontario (2968) 6 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 282; Adell, The Duty of Fair
Representation (1970) 25 IND. RELATIONS 602.
225 The Code, s. 8. No statutory language appears to deal with the special
problems which arise when the union's alleged denial of fair representation
relates to its failure to process a grievance for the complainant a st the
employer. If the union is found to have violated the statutory stanard, may
the board make an order against the employer, who may have been guilty
of no such violation, requiring reinstatement (or other redress) to be under-
taken by the employer? The issue is thoroughly ventilated, but not decided,
in Ford Motor Co. v. Gebbie [2973] O.L.R.B. REP. 519, at 528 et seq.
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However, given the possibility that the union security provisions
permitted by the Code may either forestall the employment of non-
unionists, or lead to their discharge, the issue of fair representation
may be preempted altogether. This concern takes on special intensity
in the case of those who have conscientious scruples against union
membership. For such individuals the Code offers significant protec-
tion, but it sounds in the realm of conscience, not of cash. They are
excused from compliance with union security provisions, but are still
required to pay the union a sum equivalent to union dues,22 pre-
sumably on the rationale of the Rand formula227 that they are the
beneficiaries of the union's efforts to secure and enforce the collec-
tive agreement. This latter requirement was attacked by opposition
spokesmen who unsuccessfully urged that a public purpose should be
the beneficiary of such payments by conscientious objectors, if there
were a need to neutralize the financial advantage accruing to them
because they need not pay union dues.2 ' On the other hand, some
government supporters appeared uneasy about even this degree of
relaxation in the principle of union security. One such member
urged that conscientious objectors should be excused from paying
anything to the union, but should be denied all benefits negotiated
by the union, and paid the minimum wage established by statute.2 '
In the result, British Columbia is far more solicitous of conscien-
tious objectors than Ontario, which merely protects those who have
vested rights in employment as of the date when the union security
regime begins, 230 but rather less so than Manitoba and Saskatche-
wan, both of which offer complete immunity from either participat-
ing in, or paying dues to, the union."'1
But the truly significant innovation in British Columbia is the
establishment 2 of an independent Labour Ombudsman, 3 with
power
228 Id., s. ix.
227 Ford Motor Co. v. U.A.W. (1946) 1 C.C.H. LAB. LAw REP. para. 2150
(Hon. I. C. Rand, Arbitrator).
228 J. R. Chabot (S.C., Columbia River), DE,'.TES, supra, note I, at 828-3o,
839-40; D. A. Anderson (Lib., Victoria), id., at 830-32, 844.
229 C. S. Gabelmann, supra, note 75, at 833.
230 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 3, s. 39(2).
231 Manitoba Labour Relations Act, supra, ncte 3, s. 68(3); Saskatchewan
Trade Union Act, id., s. 5(x).
232 As of the date of writing (June 1974) the statutory provisions relating to
the Labour Ombudsman had not yet been proclaimed in force.
233 The independence of the Labour Ombudsman is secured by giving him
tenure for a five year, renewable term, and by forbidding him to perform
duties or functions other than those of his office; the Code, ss. 128, 136.
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... to investigate any decision or recommendation made, or act done or
omitted, relating to a matter of administration, including the merits of
a policy, and affecting any person, ...
by a governmental agency or tribunal acting under the Labour
Code or other provincial legislation administered by the Department
of Labour, or by a trade union or an employer. 3 4
The Labour Ombudsman is given sweeping investigative
powers, 23 5 and is mandated to use those powers notwithstanding the
existence of privative clauses which might otherwise immunize deci-
sions of such bodies from scrutiny. 38 Where investigation reveals that
(a) the decision, recommendation, act, or omission affecting any person
(i) appears to be contrary to law; or
(ii) although lawful is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or im-
properly discriminatory; or
(iii) was based on a mistake of fact; or
(iv) is contrary to the public conscience; or
(b) a discretionary power has been exercised
(i) for an improper purpose; or
(ii) on an irrelevant ground; or
(iii) by taking into account an irrelevant consideration; or
(iv) without reasons being given for the decision,
the Ombudsman may make a report, including reasons and recom-
mendations, and invite a response from the person or body being
investigated."" Where his recommendations do not elicit satisfactory
action, the report is to be submitted to the Minister of Labour and
the provincial Legislature, and may be otherwise publicized by the
Ombudsman." 8
Obviously, the Labour Ombudsman is not intended to have
general curative jurisdiction in relation to all ills in the world of
industry. He has only the legal power of investigation; his reports
bear only the moral imprimatur of his office; his recommendations
have no enforcing sanction save that of publicity. But for all of
these apparent limitations, the Ombudsman's effectiveness is poten-
tially formidable. He can cut through jurisdictional boundaries, pro-
cedural rules and even substantive legal doctrines in order to arrive
at a fair and just resolution of complaints. He can make recom-
234 The Code, ss. 128, 129. However, s. 137(3) limits the investigation to the
decision per se rather than to the proceedings or evidence.
235 Id., ss. 129, 131, 132, i3(i) and (2).
236 Id., s. 130.
237 Id., s. 133.
238 Id., s. 135.
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mendations with some assurance that noncompliance will result in
great embarrassment for the alleged malefactor. And, most impor-
tanty, even where he dismisses a complaint, or where his recom-
mendations are not complied with, the complainant will have had
the satisfaction of a full and fair investigation.
What the Code does not do (except by giving the Labour
Ombudsman investigative power) is to regulate affirmatively the
internal affairs of trade unions. Innocuous provisions of the former
Labour Relations Act are carried forward requiring unions to make
available copies of their constitutions, collective agreements, and
audited financial statements.2 ' However, there is no attempt to
require unions to adhere to democratic procedures in their internal
governance, or to establish mechanisms for ensuring honest union
administration as recommended, for example, by the federal Task
Force on Labour Relations.240 Whether abuse is rare (as the Task
Force suggested), or relatively common, an opposition member who
urged in principle the adoption of such legislation24' was entitled to
some kind of response, rather than being virtually ignored. A study
undertaken for the Task Force142 shows that, at the least, the legal
position of trade union members is obscure. Whether judicial,
administrative, or internal remedies are best suited to the protection
of the status of union members is open to legitimate debate, but it
is difficult to understand why the respective merits of such procedures
were not even canvassed.
The labour movement's role in the socio-political life of the com-
munity has been, since its earliest years, a matter of debate both
within and beyond the ranks of trade unionists. 43 Amongst the
issues which have divided the Canadian labour movement for
decades are two which debate on the Code brought squarely into
focus- the political role of Canadian unions, and their indepen-
dence from foreign control. Subsumed in these two issues are a series
of fundamental assumptions about the relative efficacy of collective
bargaining as against political action, about the protection of indi-
239 Labour Relations Act, supra, note xo8, ss. 66, 66A; now the Code, ss. 142,
143.
240 Supra, note 6, paras. 485 et seq., and see also the articles cited, supra, notes
222, 224.
241 L. A. Williams (Lib., West Vancouver-Hoe Sound), DnBA.TS, supra, note
I, at 473-74.
242 Palmer, supra, note 222.
243 See, e.g., Abella, NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM AND CANADIAN LABOUR: THE
C.I.O., THE COMMXUNIST PARTY AND THE CANADIAN CONGRESS OF LABOUR,
1935-1956 (1973); Horowitz, CANADIAN LABOUR IN POLITICS (1968).
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vidual dissidents within unions and the principle of majority rule,
and about the real or imagined tradeoffs between autonomy and
access to the financial and technical resources of international unions.
Needless to say, few of these assumptions were carefully articulated
by spokesmen on either side.
The political role of labour had been a focus of special interest in
British Columbia because of labour's active support of the New
Democratic Party (and its predecessor, the C.C.F.), and because of
a series of confrontations between labour and the former Social
Credit government. In i961, that government enacted legislation
forbidding unions to contribute directly or indirectly to political
parties. The new Code predictably repealed that prohibition, with
only the briefest obituary notice from its former sponsors, now the
official opposition.
2 45
But if the new Code freed unions to support the New Democratic
Party even more effectively in the future, some labour leaders
apparently felt that the government was rather ungrateful for past
support. This element of strain between the government and its
labour allies, widely reported in the press24 and gleefully exploited
by opposition members24 has been variously explained: Mr. Barrett,
the new premier, was not favoured by the union wing of the N.D.P.
in his campaign for the party leadership; the new Code was ulti-
mately produced by a government team without formal participa-
tion by the labour movement; the selection of members for the new
Labour Relations Board did not meet with the approval of the union
hierarchy; some substantive provisions of the Code were offensive to
labour. No doubt there was some truth in each of the explanations.
More likely, however, the explanation for the strain lies in the
inevitably neutral role of government as referee in the collective
bargaining system. As the Minister of Labour stated:
... In general terms, I suggest that there is some feeling of apprehen-
sion, perhaps both in the House and perhaps out there in the trade
union movement and, undoubtedly, with some sections of management
too.... The parties seem to be concerned with securing their own posi-
tion in the balance-of-power situation, and I can understand that; rm
244 S.B.C. g6i, c. 3x, s. 5; latterly Labour Relations Act, supra, note xo8, s.
9(6) (c).
245 H. W. Schroeder (S.C., Chilliwack), DEBATES, supra, note i, at 463.
246 See, e.g., B.C. Fed flexes muscles to oppose new labor bill (Oct. 3, 1973)
Vancouver Sun; Union foes of new B.C. labour bill gather in Victoria today
(Oct. 9, 1973) Globe & Mail; Dobie, Depths of discontent (Oct. 29, 2973)
Vancouver Sun; Schreiner, Divorce coming with end of Barrett-labor honey-
moon? (Nov. 3, 1973) Financial Post.
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not condemning them for it.... I think it's fair to say that we have
approached this as a government in the spirit of trying to develop a
better climate which does not upset the balance of power which exists
between labour and management unduly and unfairly.248
Such a philosophy is more reminiscent of Metternich than of
Marx. It does not promise partisan rewards, but is inevitable if
collective bargaining is to function effectively.
The Code does not speak directly to the issue of international
versus national unionism. However, this was a frequent theme of
opposition speeches during the legislative debate. Given the bitter
warfare over nationalism within British Columbia labour circles,2
49
it is clear that the government might be embarrassed politically by
this issue. Its refusal to adopt the cause of nationalism in the legisla-
tion was several times underlined by the opposition: certification
procedures were assessed from the perspective of whether they per-
mitted workers to shift from international to national unions; 250
union security provisions were similarly evaluated ;21' requirements
that all union funds remain in Canada were advocated; 52 and an
assurance was sought that at least one member of the labour relations
board be "a representative of Canadian unions."2" 3 All to no avail.
The fate of Canadian national unions in British Coluumbia will be
determined by their ability to persuade workers to abandon tradi-
tional allegiances to international unions. In this contest as in any
other, the incumbent undoubtedly enjoys some advantage. But, here
again, the government's inevitable role is that of referee.
I. THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD AND THE COURTS
In introducing the Code on second reading in the legislature, the
Minister of Labour stated:
I think that central to the whole new concept of this new legislation is
the role that the new Labour Relations Board will play as the agency
247 See, e.g., D. A. Anderson, DEBATES, supra, note i, at 44o-42; J. R. Chabot,
id., at 899.
248 Hon. W. S. King, DEBATES, supra, note 1, at 517.
249 See, e.g., International Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental
Iron Workers Union, Local No. 97 et al. v, Canadian Ironworkers Union
No. z (2971) 21 D.L.R. (3d) 469 (S.C.C.).
250 P. L. McGeer, DEBATES, supra, note i, at 977-78.
282 Id.
252 L. A. Williams, DEBATES, supra, note 2, at 474.
253 D. A. Anderson, DEBATES, supra, note i, at 29o.
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which will be responsible for administration of industrial relations in
the province.2 54
A fair statement this is, and on its face if not "dull," at least no
more than the conventional wisdom dictates. But what a storm of
editorial comment, opposition criticism, and potential litigation it
portends. For the board can only occupy centre stage if it displaces
other distinguished actors, the judges:
The board has the structure and the personnel to understand the
dynamics of industrial relations. Therefore, it is essential that the board
be given comprehensive jurisdiction over the whole process.
The courts of law can only really catch a glimpse of the overall labour
picture. Their interference in the past has been sporadic and fortuitous.
The judges lack the intimate knowledge of the very dynamic process of
industrial relations and collective bargaining. For these reasons, Part II
of the new labour code has removed the courts' jurisdiction over labour
disputes.... The new law seeks an administrative rather than a judicial
solution to labour disputes... 55
This section of my note will attempt to describe the institution in
which so much confidence is reposed, to plot out its jurisdiction, and
to ascertain where the courts may continue to patrol the margins of
its concerns.
A. The Structure and Procedures of the Labour Relations Board
The notion that an administrative body should have a central role
in labour relations reaches back in Canada at least to the turn of the
century, 5' and probably beyond. In British Columbia, as the new
Code makes explicit, the former Labour Relations Board is merely
"continued", 27 albeit in somewhat altered form. Thus, there is no
sharp departure in principle from earlier legislation. As will be seen,
it is in the application of the established principle of administrative
adjudication to new areas of controversy that the Code is relatively
innovative.
The new board is well, if conventionally, designed to receive and
exercise broad powers. Like most Canadian labour relations
boards, 5s the British Columbia board has a tripartite membership
254 Hon. W. S. King, DzBATEs, supra, note i, at 396.
255 Id., at 399-400.
256 Conciliation and Labour Act, R.S.C. i9o6, c. 96; Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act, S.C. 1907, c. 20.
257 The Code, s. 12 (1).
258 With the notable exception of the Canada Labour Relations Board; see
Canada Labour Code, supra, note 4, s. zX 1 (2).
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of neutral presiding officers and representative members. 59 However,
unlike most other boards, it may sit in panels comprising only neutral
members.2"0 This arrangement offers several unique advantages.
First, in some cases it may be difficult to establish a tripartite panel
whose composition does not give rise to at least a suspicion of bias
against one of the parties. " ' Second, the added flexibility of so staff-
ing the panels may expedite hearings. Third, and most important,
the board will be permitted to decide cases free from the constraints
of partisanship or "horse-trading" which sometimes characterize the
executive sessions of tripartite bodies.
However, it is equally true that all of these problems would fall
away if the board were composed entirely of neutral members, as
recommended by the federal Task Force, 2,' and by an unsuccessful
opposition amendment. " The government offered no explanation
for the retention of a tripartite board.
One difficulty confronting any tribunal which sits in panels
(including an appellate court) is that of preserving consistency
amongst the panels. This difficulty is compounded if there is no
higher body which can reconcile conflicting lines of decision as they
emerge. Informal consultation between members of different panels
is no doubt one expedient often resorted to, but it may infringe the
principle that "he who decides must hear,"12 6' and in any event yields
no formal resolution of differences. The new Code neatly solves
this problem by providing for the establishment of a panel to which
questions of law may be referred, by the board or by other panels,
for binding decision. " Presumably this panel will be staffed entirly
by neutrals.
The board possesses useful powers with which to discharge its
fact-finding tasks. Like virtually all such bodies, it has power inter
alia to compel testimony, to accept evidence which may not be
259 The Code, s. 12(2).
260 Id., s. 13(3)(a) and (b).
261 See Arthurs, supra, note 138, and R. v. B.C.L.R.B., Ex parte Int'l. Union
of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers (1964) 45 D.L.R. (2d) 27 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Manitoba L.R.B., Ex parte CAE Industries Ltd. (1969) 6 D.L.R.(3d) 451 (MAN. C.A.) ; Re Diamond Construction (196z) Ltd. v. Construc-
tion & General Labourers, Local zo79 (1973) 39 D.L.R. (3d) 318
(N.B.C.A.).
262 Supra, note 6, para. 735 et seq.
263 G. S. Wallace (Cons., Oak Bay), DEBATES, supra, note x, at 881.
264 Finkelman, THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELLTIONS BOARD AND NATURAL
JUsTICE (z965) 9-1x; Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada [5955] 2
D.L.R. 289 (S.C.C.), per Cartwright J., at 295.
265 The Code, s. 16.
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admissible in a court of law, to enter and inspect premises and
examine records, and to perform certain investigative functions
through an authorized agent. 266 It is master of its own procedures,
subject to the requirement that parties be afforded a full opportunity
to be heard.2 67 An opposition attempt to particularize this require-
ment by a statutory guarantee of the right to counsel was rejected
by the government, but the minister did undertake that this right
would be set forth in any rules of procedure issued by the board.268
In relation to the development of its substantive doctrine, how-
ever, the board is assisted by several unusual statutory provisions.
The establishment of a special panel to make binding interpretations
of the Code has already been referred to. A requirement that all
decisions be made available in writing for publication 6 . is an
important advance over the former British Columbia practice of
unpublished decisions. The board's jurisprudence will now be avail-
able for the guidance of parties before it, for public evaluation and
criticism, and thus perhaps ultimately for more careful refinement
by the board. In light of this advance, it is somewhat difficult to
understand an opposition attempt to compel publication of every
decision.2 70
In addition to deciding specific questions of law in the context of
particular controversies, the board has several other methods by
which it can articulate doctrine and policy. It may issue declaratory
opinions upon the complaint of a person injured by "an agreement
or combination that substantially affects trade and commerce," M
or on application or on its own motion, in relation to any matter
arising under the statute.7 2 The most promising vehicle for develop-
ing doctrine is found in the board's power to "formulate general
policies.., for the guidance of the general public and the board."2 8
While the board is not bound by such policies, neither does a rule
of stare decisis commit it to doctrine developed in the context of
litigation.74 However, the board will have awakened public expecta-
266 Id., ss. 18, x9, 2o and 35-
267 Id., s. 21.
268 DEBAThS, supra, note 2, at 895 et seq., esp. Hon. W. S. King, at 895.
269 The Code, s. 23.
270 DEBATES, supra, note i, at 922 et seq.
271 The Code, s. 90.
272 Id., s. 38.
273 It., s. 27().




tions by inviting submissions in the process of formulating the policy,
and in publishing it after adoption." 5 It will be awkward for the
board to abandon such a policy, at least without a prospective
announcement of its demise.
B. The Board's Powers and The Prospects for Judicial Review
As both its admirers and its critics contend, the British Columbia
board possesses broader powers under the new Code than other
Canadian labour tribunals. But, again the difference is in degree not
kind, in particulars not principle.
Under the former British Columbia statute, the Labour Relations
Board had already acquired broad remedial power in respect of
unfair labour practices,2"' while the Mediation Commission Act
gave the provincial cabinet equally broad power in respect of strikes
affecting "the public interest and welfare."277 Thus while the Code
undoubtedly extends these powers, it does so under cover of what-
ever legitimacy precedent confers.
The remedies available to the board to control unfair labour
practices and economic warfare have been explored above."78
Affirmatively, the board's power rests on a broad mandate to
... order ... any ... person, to do anything for the purpose of comply-
ing with this Act or the regulations, or refrain from doing anything in
contravention of this Act or the regulations.27
In a negative sense, its exclusive jurisdiction is defended on three
sides by privative clauses,"O and on the fourth by a network of provi-
sions.. specifically denying the courts recourse to substantive doc-
trines or remedies which might permit them to deal at first instance
with matters consigned to the board.22
275 The Code, ss. 27(2) and (3).
276 Labour Relations Act, supra, note 1o8, s. 7(4)-
277 S.B.C. x968, c. 26, s. 18.
278 Supra, parts II C, Protecting the Right to Organize and II G, The Rules
of Economic Conflict.
279 The Code, s. 28.
280 Id., 2s. 3 (), 33, and 34-
281 Id., ss. 31(2), 32, 87, and 89.
282 As has been noted, these latter provisions may not have the effect of entirely
excluding the courts. For example, not all tort doctrines have been abolished
or made inapplicable in the context of "labour disputes": the meaning of
that term itself may be narrowly construed; the courts' right to award
damages is not impaired, except in respect of a limited list of causes of
action; and even the labour injunction lingers on where there is a serious
danger to life or health or where the condact lies beyond the Code's reach.
But these exceptions apart, it is essentially true to say that the primary




The board, then, is to occupy the whole field of regulating labour
relations, to the virtual exclusion of the courts. In adopting this
institutional scheme the government forfeited a good deal of support
from an otherwise essentially sympathetic press: "A labour board
beyond the courts," cried one editorial;2"' "Alarming B.C. labour
bill," warned another. 84 What was the government's motive in seek-
ing to displace the courts? And what arguments were mustered in
reply?
Essentially, the government argued,"8 the board is better equipped
as an institution to do the job than the courts, and should be given
full powers to develop comprehensive answers to deep-rooted prob-
lems. However, never far from the surface in the presentation of
the government's case, was an antipathy towards the courts and a
resentment of their perceived historic role as an enemy of labour.
Consider, for example, the remarks of one minister:
I've never seen labour, or really seldom seen labour, get a fair shake in
the courts because there is an attitude in the courts that isn't conducive
to giving working people a fair shake.... I mean, I just get the feeling
that the kind of people who are appointed judges in this system are the
kind of people who are designed to go in there and maintain the status
quo .... 288
Of of another:
We have watched for years and years and years the courts take over this
whole procedure. The courts are finite as well Mr. Member. What
makes you think that courts are some sort of area where natural justice
can be delivered? ... 287
Or of a bitter government member, himself the veteran of much
litigation:
2s3 Editorial (Oct. 3, 1973) Toronto Star:
Arbitrary powers are likely to be exercised arbitrarily ...
- J. C. McRuer, former Chief Justice of Ontario in his 1958 [sic] report
on civil rights ...
... [T]he McRuer statement quoted above distills a wise scepticism. An
agency which operates free of judicial restraint, and with scant reference
to the people's elected representatives, wields arbitrary power, however
fair and conscientious its members may try to be.
284 Editorial (Oct., 1973) Toronto Globe and Mail:
The British Columbia Government appears, so far as labor-management
matters are concerned, to have jettisoned the rule of law for the rule of
men....
285 Hon. W. S. King, DEBATES, supra, note 255, at 892.
286 Hon. G. R. Lea, Minister of Highways, id., at 475.
287 Hon. D. G. Cocke, Minister of Health Services and Hospital Insurance, id.,
at 932.
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To me what we've had has been years and years of court battles. There
has been a heavy cost and it's created a lot of hard feelings, and it's
created a lot of hostility. I think that I personally have enough injunc-
tions to paper this room.
I had my family home taken from me in 1967; I never got it back
until 1972. That's the sort of feelings that we've had generated in the
labour movement as a result of going to court - always going to court.
As I see it now, the kind of argument that's being made by the opposi-
tion is that you could go back to the court for various decisions. To me
that means that anyone who has the dough, anyone who has the
finances, is going to be appealing and being back in the court, and we
won't have really changed anything....28s
In equally impassioned language, the opposition members sought
to preserve a role for the courts. Interestingly, this role was perceived
almost entirely as secondary, involving appeals from the board,
rather than as primary, involving the award of damages or injunc-
tions. The tone of the opposition's case is well illustrated by several
speeches made in support of a Liberal amendment to give jurisdic-
tion to the Court of Appeal to decide stated cases on questions of
law and to set aside board decisions, inter alia, for "error of law
affecting the jurisdiction of the board [and] denial of naturaljusti ce"): 2
Now, Mr. Chairman, the reason for this amendment is very, very
obvious. We had some very weak-hearted and weak-sistered protesta-
tions from the Hon. Attorney General (Hon. Mr. MacDonald) that
the common law of England, from its inception until 1858, and the
common law of Caanda, from then until this day truly applied to this
bill. These prerogative writs which have emanated from the 13 th cen-
tury on sprung initially from the curia regis or the King's Council; they
are royal protections from the abuses of power of governing officials. It
would seem, upon a close analysis of the legislation, that these writs
have disappeared for all practical purposes, save and except one small
illustration which the Hon. Minister brought in by way of amendment.
We have 6oo years of precedent with these writs and 6oo years of
protection applied through thousands, and literally hundreds of thou-
sands of fact situations in all of the Commonwealth countries in the
world.These writs have been able to do justice and perform equity and
to see that might was not right. We find these historic protections
essentially dashed to smithereens in this chamber .... 290
From another Liberal member:
It's not a question of appealing to the courts on whether or not the
board made a correct judgment in accordance with the facts before it.
288 C. Liden (N.D.P., Delta), id., at 933.
289 G. B. Gardom, id., at io44.
290 Id.
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We're not asking them to appeal on the grounds that the judges in the
court may have a different opinion from the members of the board; it's
not that type of appeal at all. It is a very specific appeal, and in my
mind it is critical to the continued system of democracy as we know it -
the Canadian system of law - that appeal be permitted .... 291
Predictably the Minister of Labour was unmoved by these argu-
ments:
Nor do I think that in these circumstances the important question of
industrial relations should be frequently appealed to the courts on
various points of law simply to open the door to the question and the
adjudication of industrial relations matters in the courts, which has
proved not to be the most appropriate agency for dealing with this
question .... 292
Thus, the debate concluded with the Code's privative clauses intact.
As mentioned, these are three in number. The first two are quite
conventional, the third novel, controversial, and arguably unconsti-
tutional. The first of these clauses stipulates that
... the board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide for all purposes of this
Act any question, including, without restricting the generality of the
foregoing, ... [a list of twenty specific matters] .... 3
Save for the list of specifid matters, which presumably add precision
but not effect, this language is virtually identical to that of the"
Ontario Labour Relations Act'. The second privatiye clause is a
commonplace admonition, again identical to the Ontario statute,2
5
save in one important respect, discussed below:
A decision... of the board made under this Act in respect of any matter
in which jurisdiction is conferred by this Act, or is determined under
section 33 to be conferred by this Act, is final and conclusive, and is not
open to question or review in any court....295
The Ontario statute, however, has been treated rather disdainfully
by the Supreme Court of-Canada in such recent cases as Jarvis v.
Associated Medical Services Ltd.297 and International Union of
Operating. Engineers, Local 796 v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
291 D. A. Ahiderson, id., at 3o45.
292 oHon. W. S. King, id., at 1047.
293 The Code, s. 34().
294 Supra,' note 3, s. 95().
29 Id., s. 97.
96 The Code, s. 34(2) [emphasis added].
207 (i96i) 61 C.L.L.C., para. 16,218 (O.L.R.B.), cert. granted (3962) 35
D.L.R. (2d) 375 (ONT. C.A.), aff'd. (1964) 44 D.L.R. (2d) 407 (S.C.C.).
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Co." ' The Court's evident desire to pre, ent what it seems to regard
as administrative overreaching has fueled its inventive instincts.
Forms of words have been developed which permit it to circumnavi-
gate privative clauses with relative ease: "the Board cannot, by an
erroneous interpretation of ... the Act confer upon itself a jurisdic-
tion it otherwise would not have," ' "the Board, by asking itself the
wrong question, has stepped outside its jurisdiction."30 These cases,
and others, have been subjected to searching criticism by many com-
mentators,"0' and there is no need to rehearse their analysis here.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that if rational argument
based on the evident and expressed intent of the legislature could
have persuaded the Court to a more restrained view of its reviewing
function these cases would have been decided differently.
If this estimate of the Supreme Court is at all accurate, and if
indeed the Court is bound and determined to penetrate heavy gauge
privative boilerplate, will it be turned aside by the efforts of the
draughtsmen of the new Code?
It is certainly true that the Code contains a third, ingenious priva-
tive clause, referred to in the language quoted earlier - "jurisdic-
tion ... determined under section 33 to be conferred by this Act,
is final and conclusive... ." Section 33, the clause in question, seeks
to respond directly to the Court's recent penchant for correcting
perceived administrative error by labelling it "jurisdictional". The
section provides:
The board, in respect of matters [under stipulated sections] has and
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to determine the extent of its juris-
diction under those sections, or to determine any fact or question of law
that is necessary to establish its jurisdiction.
Will section 33 succeed where its predecessors have failed?
At a minimum, section 33 may not respond directly to the formu-
298 (x967) 67 C.L.L.C., para. z6,026 (O.L.R.B.), cert. granted (1970) 1i
D.L.R. (3d) 336 (S.C.C.).
299 Supra, note 297, per Cartwright J., at 411.
300 Supra, note 298, per Cartwright J., at 344.
301 See, e.g., Weler, supra, note x28; Hogg, The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine
in the Supreme Court of Canada (1971) 90SGOODE HALL L.J. 203; Angus,
Judicial Review in Canada: Do We Need It? (x974~,) 26 AD. L. REv.; Hogg,Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need? (x974) 26 A. L. Rzv.,
20 MCGILL L.J. For a partial list of earlier articles see Laskin, sup ra, note
236; Strayer, The Concept of Jurisdiction in Review of Labour Relations
Board Decisions (2963) 28 SASH. BAR RE,. 157; Weatherill, Labour Rela-
tions Boards and the Courts (x966) 22 IN!). RELATIONS 58; Carter, The
Apparent Virility of Privative Clauses [1967] U.B.C. L. REV. 219; Norman,
The Privative Clause: Virile or Futile (1969) 34 SASK. L. REv. 334.
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lation that the board has stepped outside its jurisdiction by asking
itself "the wrong question." Section 33 only comes into play where
the board obeys the statutory commandment that it "shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction" to determine its own jurisdiction. In the
absence of a specific threshold finding by the board that it has juris-
diction, section 33 does not come into play, but it is not clear that a
pro forma finding by the board would satisfy this requirement. And
if the board asks itself the "wrong" jurisdictional question, will its
determination under section 33 be respected?
Second, representations made, somewhat equivocally, by the
Attorney General in the course of debate suggest another possible
route by which judicial review might be secured. Resisting an opposi-
tion amendment designed to specifically assure access to the courts,
the Attorney General expressed the view that in the event of denial
of natural justice, judicial review was still possible, notwithstanding
the legislative language:
And when I suggest in this bill that the right to go to the courts in terms
of a denial of natural justice is still present, I say that i's present in
terms of all bur inferior tribunals in the Province of British Columbia.
... It isn't true to say that regardless of any error there is no access to
the courts.... I don't think there is any privative section in this bill, is
there? [Interjection] There is? Okay. Let's deal with this section, but
let me just say this: in spite of that section, the rules of common law
apply and the question of natural justice applies.... As I say, the
unwritten laws of England apply to this inferior tribunal .... 302
The Minister of Labour appeared to endorse this position:
The Attorney General has made the point very well .... 303
Thus, it seems, at least from the perspective of legislative history,
that there may be review on the grounds of denial of natural justice.
But denial of natural justice is said to deprive a tribunal of jurisdic-
tion.04 Should not section 33 therefore apply to the board's right to
define its own jurisdiction on procedural as well as substantive
grounds? An affirmative answer raises a yet more basic problem.
Either section 33 precludes review on both procedural and substan-
tive grounds - in which case the Attorney General seems to have
erred, or it precludes review on neither ground - in which case the
302 Hon. A. MacDonald, DEBATES, supra, note i, at 926-27.
803 Hon. W. S. King, id., at 927.
304 See, e.g., Finkelman, supra, note 264, at 1-2; Reid, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE (1971) 187; Re Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing
Company [1951 3 D.L.R. z62 (ONT. H.C.) per Gale J., at 194.
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Code is quite a different instrument than both the government and
opposition believed.
The third difficulty with relation to section 33 may conceivably
be the most serious. It is possible that a court may hold that the func-
tion of determining the jurisdictional limits of an inferior tribunal
was historically vested in a "section 96" superior, county or district
court, and that this function thus cannot constitutionally be assigned
to a "non-section 96" tribunal. This possibility will be canvassed
below.
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Board's Exclusive Jurisdiction
It is reasonably safe to predict that the new Code will, sooner or
later, be subjected to constitutional challenge. At least three possible
lines of attack can be anticipated:
(a) there is a constitutional right of access to the courts for purposes
of securing review of the board's decisions;
(b) more narrowly, section 33 assigns to the board the power to
define its own jurisdiction, a function analogous to that of a
"section 96" court, thus violating the constitutional requirement
for federal appointment of judges; and
(c) the board's responsibility for controlling strikes and picketing is
likewise a "section 96" function, and is similarly unconstitu-
tionally assigned to it.
I shall examine each of these possibilities in turn.
Turning first to the argument that there is a constitutional right
of access to judicial review, it would seem that this proposition is
dubious at best. It had been advanced by a judge of first instance in
Farrell v. Workmen's Compensation Board,"'5 brushed aside by the
provincial appellate Court,3" and summarily rejected by the
Supreme Court of Canada. " Both the provincial appellate Court
and the Supreme Court treated the point as well settled and dis-
missed the appellant's argument out of hand, citing a line of
authority running back at least to 1923." It is thus somewhat sur-
prising, at first blush, to be confronted with the suggestion by Pro-
fessor Lyon, a distinguished scholar, that there is
305 (xg6o) 24 D.L.R. (2d) 272 (B.C.S.C.), per Manson J., at 276-77.
306 (1961) 26 D.L.R. (2d) x85 (B.C.C.A.), per Davey J.A., at 192.
307 (g6i) 3 D.L.R. (2d) 177 (S.C.C.) per Judson J., at 18o-8i. See also
Woodward Estate v. Minister of Finance (1972) 27 D.L.R. (3d) 6o8
(S.C.C.) per Martland J., at 613-14.




... a constitutional requirement that certain kinds of questions - legal
questions -be subject to ultimate determination, either by appeal or
review, by courts of law manned by an independent judiciary .... e
In terms of the weight of authority, Professor Lyon would seem
to have a substantial onus of explanation to discharge. He does not
so much challenge Farrell as seek to distinguish it. He speaks approv-
ingly of the analysis of Laidlaw J.A. in R. v. O.L.R.B., Ex Parte
Ontario Food Terminal Board..0 which failed to mention the
Supreme Court's decision in Farrell, and which in any event was
effectively demolished both by Professor Laskin"'1 and by McRuer
C.J.H.C.3 1 2 On what authority, then, does Professor Lyon's conten-
tion rest? Essentially it rests on Labour Relations Board of Saskatche-
wan v. John East Iron Works Ltd."'3 which, he contends, "viewed
as a whole ... rather than in fragmented snippets""1 supports the
proposition announced above. According to Professor Lyon, relying
on the Ontario Food Terminal decision:
... a pure question of law ... cannot be finally and conclusively deter-
mined by a provincial labour relations board. This is a function reserved
by section 96 to certain courts, and while the initial determination must
necessarily be made by the board under the mixed functions rationale
of John East Iron Works Ltd., any attempt by the legislature to prevent,
by privative enactment, ultimate recourse to a section 96 court on the
pure question of law would run afoul of the purpose underlying sections
96-oo and therefore would be invalid.315
The italicized words - "pure question of law" and "mixed func-
tions rationale" -hold the key to Professor Lyon's view. As his
discussion of. Farrell makes clear,"1 6 it is the dilution of the board's
duty to decide cases on the basis of "pure" law by the admixture of
policy considerations which prevents the operation of section 96.
Indeed, Professor Lyon goes so far as to distinguish workmen's
s00 Lyon, Comment (197x) 49 CAN. B. REv. 365, at 368. Professor Lyon relies
for this assertion on Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary (1956)
34 CAN. B. REv. 769, 1139.
310 (1963) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 530 (ONT. C.A.).
311 (Now Chief Justice of Canada). Laskin, Comment (1963) 41 CAN. B. Rv.
446.
312 R. v. O.L.R.B.,Ex Parte Taylor (1964) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 456 (ONT. H.C.),
aff'd and leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied, (1964) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 32o n.
313 [1948] 4 D.L.R. 673, [1949] A.C. 134 (P.C.).
314 Supra, note 309, at 369.
315 Id. [emphasis added].
316 Id., at 370 et seq.
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compensation boards (and possible human rights commissions) from
labour relations boards on this basis."'
In my submission, his argument fails in general terms, and with
specific reference to the British Columbia Labour Code.
In general terms, there is no basis in principle for the assertion of
a constitutional right of access to the courts. Although Professor
Ledernan is acknowledged as the source of Professor Lyon's inter-
pretation of section 96,318 it is he who provides the analogy which
underlines the improbability of the Lyon thesis. Commenting on the
nature of free speech under our constitution, Professor Ledennan
has stated:
Freedom of expression is the residual area of natural liberty remaining
after the makers of the common law and the statute law have en-
croached a little by creating inconsistent duties....azg
Paraphrasing, one can only surmise that:
'Access to the courts is the residual area of protection remaining after
the makers of the statute law have encroached a little....'
As goes free speech, so goes judicial review. In a system of parlia-
mentary government, it would be astonishing if the legislatures (and,
even more so, the courts) could whittle down to the vanishing point
the exercise of free speech which is so vital to the processes of a
parliamentary democracy, while the courts retained an irreducible
core jurisdiction not simply to referee constitutional battles, but to
finally decide any millrun controversy so long as it is essentially
"legal". This would give the courts a preferred position in our con-
stitution wholly at odds with its basic premise of parliamentary
supremacy.
Second, whatever may be its implicit assumptions, section 96 is
an appointing power dealing with the judges of "superior, country
and district" courts in the provinces. It says nothing about federal
administrative tribunals nor does section i oi which speaks only to
the establishment of additional federal courts and not to the appoint-
ment of their members. It seems clear (at least I am unaware of
contrary authority) that the federal government could set up a tri-
bunal identical in every respect to the British Columbia Labour
Board without attracting the constitutional strictures of section 96.
317 Id., at 379.
318 Supra, note 309.
319 Lederman, The Nature and Problems of a Bill of Rights (1959) 37 CAN.
B. RMv. 4, at 8-9.
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As the Supreme Court of Canada has held,32 and as the language
of the Federal Court Act makes clear,32' the federal government can
prevent the provincial courts from reviewing federal agencies, and
give as much or as little reviewing power as is thought wise to the
federal courts, so long as the activity in respect of which the federal
government asserts control is one which otherwise falls within its
constitutional competence. Are the provincial governments subject
to greater constraints in respect of provincially regulated activities?
If (as appears to be conceded) the province can validly replace the
prerogative writs with a new statutory form of review, if the scope
of review can be broadened in some respects and narrowed in others,
if jurisdiction to review can be assigned to a new court, 22 why can-
not the province simply abolish the writs without establishing a
statutory substitute, or narrow the scope of review to the vanishing
point, or simply refuse to assign jurisdiction to review to any court?
In short, is there a logically defensible and constitutionally significant
distinction between legislating to limit judicial review and legislating
to abolish it? I think not. As Laskin J. (as he then was) stated in
Pringle v. Fraser:
This Court has held that habeas corpus, certainly as honoured a remedy
as certiorari, takes its colour from the substantive matters in respect of
which it is sought to be invoked, and its availability may depend on
whether it is prescribed as a remedy by the competent legislature: ...
So too, certiorari, as a remedial proceeding, has no necessary ongoing
life in relation to all matters for which it could be used, if competent
excluding legislation is enacted.3 28
Third, Professor Lyon seems to concede that the provincial
governments can abolish substantive legal rights, and substitute for
them rules or policies which are not "pure law". 24 They can clearly
create new causes of action by legislation and alter or abolish causes
of action developed by the common law. And if these drastic meas-
ures lie within provincial competence may they not also adopt the
more modest measure of substituting administrative for curial
decision-making?
It is the affirmative answer given to this last question by the John
East case which brings us to the meat of the matter: what is the
220 Pringle et al. v. Fraser (1972) 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28 (S.C.C.).
321 Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. i, ss. x8 and 28.
322 See the Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48.
323 Supra, note 32o, at 32.
324 Supra, note 309, at 370.
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critical constitutional difference between a court and an administra-
tive tribunal? Pointing out that section 96 requires not only federal
appointment, but as well legal qualifications for tribunal members,
the Privy Council asks whether
... if trade unions had in 1867 been recognized by the law, if collective
bargaining had been the accepted postulate of industrial peace ... it
would not have been expedient to establish just such a specialized tri-
bunal as is provided by ... the [Saskatchewan Labour Relations] Act.
It is as good a test... to ask whether the subject-matter of the assumedjusticiable issue makes it desirable that the judges should have the same
qualifications as those which distinguish the judges of superior or other
courts .... 325
Referring to the "experience and knowledge acquired extra-
judicially" required of board members, 28 the Privy Council rejects
the proposition that section 96 appointments are required. Contrary
to Professor Lyon, I believe that it is this factor which explains John
East, and not the issue of "mixed functions." And needless to say,
the very considerations which swayed the Privy Council in John
East are present in the British Columbia Labour Code; the Code is
virtually identical to the Saskatchewan labour relations statute
sustained in that case.
It must be conceded, as Professor Lyon notes,""7 that the Privy
Council, obiter dicta, expressed some diffidence about the privative
clause in the Saskatchewan Act. However, whereas he treats this as a
general constitutional caveat about privative clauses, I read the
Privy Council as offering views on the effect of the particular lan-
guage before it.3"
Does anything, finally, turn on distinctions between the Labour
Relations Board and workmen's compensation boards, which might
explain why the former may merely be provincially constituted,
while the latter may also be immunized from judicial review? The
Privy Council refused to make any such comparison.3"9 But the
325 Supra, note 313, at x5o-5i.
326 Id.
327 Supra, note 309, at 367-68, n. 15.
328 John East case, supra, note 313, at 151-52:
But the same considerations which make it expedient to set up a spe-
cialized tribunal may make it inexpediFnt that that tribunal's decisions
should be reviewed by an ordinary court. It does not for that reason
become itself a "superior" court. Nor mrust its immunity from certiorari
or other proceedings be pressed too far. It does not fall to their Lordships
on the present appeal to determine the scope of that provision, but it
seems clear that it would not avail the tribunal if it purported to exercise
a jurisdiction wider than that specificall> entrusted to it by the Act.
329 Id., at 152.
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Supreme Court of Canada relied inter alia, upon John East in decid-
ing Farrell, and held that:
If an argument based upon s. 96 of the B.N.A. Act is untenable, the
other argument based upon right of access to the Court's falls with
it.... Short of an infringement of this section, if the legislation is other-
wise within the provincial power, there is no constitutional rule against
the enactment of [the privative clause] .330
The Supreme Court, apparently, did not share Professor Lyon's
views about the distinction between the two tribunals.
Turning next to the specific provisions of the Code, its privative
clause would seem to be valid even if one accepts Professor Lyon's
broad thesis that
... the constiutional rationale of sections 96-IOO continues to require
that labour relations boards decide questions of law according to estab-
lished legal principles .... 331
As the legislative debates make clear, the intention of the Code
was to reduce legalism in the decision of labour controversies. This
intention is reflected in many ways: the use of settlement procedures
under the board's auspices for unfair labour practices3 2 and griev-
ances; 33 the promulgation of "general policies ... for the guidance
of the general public and the board" (albeit within the terms of the
Act, and without binding effect) ;.34 the use of declaratory
opinions;... and the power to refuse relief 3 or to grant conditional
relief,3" in order to balance the equities between the parties. All
of these important, innovative powers indicate that much of what
the board is doing is more varied and complex, and decidedly differ-
ent, than "deciding" cases, much less deciding them "according to
established legal principles." Even in the decisional process, the
board has a broad-ranging mandate to develop its record in ways
quite unfamiliar to any court: it may examine records, machinery
and premises; conduct votes 8. and delegate powers of investiga-
330 Supra, note 307, at x83.
331 Supra, note 309, at 371.
332 The Code, s. 8(2).
3 Id., s. 97.
3 Id., s. 27(1).
335 Id., ss. 38, 90.
336 Id., s. 91.
s37 Id., S. 29.
331 Id., s. 3 5 (d)-(i).
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tion,'" and decision; 4 0 and settle the conditions of a first agreement
between the parties on the basis of statistical comparisons. 4'
Can the decision of "questions of law according to established
legal principles" be antiseptically separated from this network of
interacting powers and procedures without doing violence to the
whole flexible scheme of the Code? I suggest that the Code (to
borrow two of Professor Lyon's phrases) "viewed as a whole ...
rather than in fragmented snippets" cries out for the "exclusion of
strict law," '42 no less than the explicit language of the workmen's
compensation statute3 3 which is conceded by him to justify the priv-
ative clause in Farrell.
I reiterate my view, then, that the Code cannot be constitutionally
impugned on the ground that it largely or entirely eliminates judicial
review. This is not to say, however, that the particular method by
which this result is sought is necessarily valid.
Section 33, which gives the board power to determine the extent
of its own jurisdiction, may be open to the objection that it assigns
section 96-type functions to the board. On this argument, it was the
task of superior courts in 1867 to define the jurisdiction of inferior
tribunals, and this task cannot be assigned to another body which is
not appointed in accordance with section 96.
This was, in essence, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Canada in its unanimous decision in Seminary of Chicoutimi v.
A.G. of Quebec et al.34 The Court there struck down a statute con-
ferring upon the Quebec provincial courts power to quash municipal
by-laws on the grounds of illegality, on the ground that
[O]n the eve of Confederation the Superior Court still exercised
the special jurisdiction ... to exercise a superintending and reforming
power and control over Courts of inferior jurisdiction and ... municipal
corporations.... [T] he jurisdiction conferred by the legislative provi-
sions the constitutionality of which is now being challenged is not, in a
general way, in conformity with the kind of jurisdiction exercised in
339 Id., s. 35(j)-
340 Id., s. 17.
341 Id., s. 71(b).
342 Supra, note 309, at 370.
843 Workmen's Compensation Act, S.B.C. 1968, c. 59, s. 82:
The Board is not bound to follow legal precedent; its decision shall be
given according to the merits and justice of the case and, where there is
doubt on any issue and the disputed poisibilities are evenly balanced, the
issue shall be resolved in accordance with that possibility which is favour-
able to the workman.
34 (972) 27 D..R (3d) 356 (S.C.C.).
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x867 by the Courts of summary jurisdiction, but conforms rather to the
kind of jurisdiction exercised by the Courts described in s. 96.-14
From this perspective, section 33 may well be vulnerable.
However, the section maybe viewed in another light. The Labour
Relations Board does not claim a general "superintending and
reforming power and control" over the decisions of other tribunals,
or even over its own decisions. To be sure, the board is given the
right to make binding decisions on questions of law respecting the
interpretation of the Code,'4 but these decisions are not necessarily
concerned with jurisdictional issues. In the same vein, the board's
power to reconsider, vary and cancel its own decisions 4 7 is not
limited to jurisdictional issues. These are more general powers, no
doubt partly designed to avoid error, partly to permit error to be
corrected, and partly to assure that correct decisions can be altered
when underlying circumstances change. When, in the exercise of these
powers, the board deals with jurisdictional issues, it is as an incident
of its general obligation to administer the Code, and not as a discrete
task assigned to it rather than to a section 96 court. The board is
exercising original, rather than "superintending and reforming,"
jurisdiction.
Which of these two views a court would accept is problematic,
but I would suspect that an attack on section 33 would have some
reasonable chance of success. It is easy enough to understand, how-
ever, why the draughtsmen sought to give the board power to define
its own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, at least since Farrell, has
been prepared to concede that so long as the board is acting within
its jurisdiction, it has the right to be wrong on questions of fact and
of law.4 ' If (as I have suggested) the Court has tended to go to
extreme lengths to find jurisdictional error in order to circumvent
its own self-denying ordinance, 49 it is predictable that a legislature
should take equally extreme measures to force the Court to live by
its own rules.
345 Id., at 359-64, passim.
346 The Code, s. 16.
347 Id., s. 36. The board has laid down some guidelines limiting the exercise of
its "almost unlimited" power to reconsider its own decisions. Essentially, the
board will be reluctant to reconsider factual matters, more amenable to
reconsideration of "conclusions of law or general policy." See Burnaby v.
C.U.P.E., Local 23 [1974] 1 CANADIAN L.R.B.R. 128 (B.C. L.R.B.).
348 See, e.g., Noranda Mines v. The Queen et al. (z969) 7 D.L.R. (3d)
(S.C.C.).
349 I believe that Prof. Lyon and I are in agreement on this point; see supra,
note 309, at 379.
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Perhaps instead of giving the board exclusive power under section
33 to define its own jurisdiction, the Legislature could have denied
to the court jurisdiction to determine whether the board acted within
its jurisdiction. This explicit commandment addressed in unmistake-
able language to the court, would have accomplished the same
result, without raising the section 96 problem. If such a provision
had been incorporated in the Supreme Court Act,350 its effect might
have been made yet more certain, because the Legislature would
then be seen to be not so much explanding the board's jurisdiction
(even by negative implication) as limiting that of the courts.
This approach, of course, issuggested by what I have earlier des-
cribed as a "network" of defensive provisions complementing the
Code's three privative clauses, by ousting the courts' original juris-
diction over matters consigned to the board. Specific reference
should be made to two types of provisions. First, there are those
which provide that "no action lies'" 1 in respect of certain conduct,
or that conduct "is not actionable." '52 Second, there are those which
deprive the court of
... jurisdiction in respect of a matter that is, or may be, the subject of
a complaint under [the section empowering the board to give relief]
or a matter [relating to strikes and picketing], and, without restricting
the generality of the foregoing, no court shall make an order enjoining
or prohibiting any such act or thing ... in support of a claim for
damages.3 5 3
Both types of provisions seem constitutionally invulnerable. It can
hardly be argued that section 96 is offended either by abolishing a
cause of action or by abolishing, or rendering unavailable in defined
circumstances, a particular remedy.
This leaves for consideration only a possible challenge based on
the notion that the board's power to order that workers refrain from
striking or picketing" is illicitly analogous to a "section 96" court's
power to enjoin striking or picketing. Such an argument ought not
to succeed.
The test of jurisdiction, as the Privy Council has pointed out, is
not whether the board is deciding an issue which is "justiciable", but
rather whether such an issue is one "which [was] familiar to the
350 The Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. x96o, c. 374, ss. 9 and zo.
351 The Code, s. 87.
352 Id., s. 89.
353 Id., s. 31(2).
s54 Id., s. 28.
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courts of I867." '' Injunctions against picketing and strikes were
unknown to the courts of that period, and in fact would have
offended against certain substantive doctrines accepted by the courts
until relatively recently, especially in relation to attempts to prevent
work stoppages by forcing employees to go to work. In LB.E.W. v.
Winnipeg Builders' Exchange,5' Cartwright C.J.C. quoted with
approval"" the words of Monnin J.A. in the Manitoba Court of
Appeal, when the latter declined to defer to equity's long-standing
rule against enforcing contracts of personal service:
The complexity of labour-management relations in a highly indus-
trialized civilization were presumably not even thought of by Lord St.
Leonards, L.C., when he had to decide whether [to enforce a contract
of personal service in Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 E.R. 687].358
What Lord St. Leonards L.C. had not thought of in 1852, his
Canadian judicial brethren had not yet encountered by 1867; the
modem regulation of labour-management relations in aid of collec-
tive bargaining still lay decades in the future.
If not in 1867, then shortly thereafter,"5 9 the courts did assert an
equitable jurisdiction to enjoin picketing on the basis of common
law rules, such as the torts of nuisance, conspiracy, and inducing
breach of contract But it must be remembered that the board does
not purport to administer common law rules, nor even a statutory
codification of such rules. The board is regulating strikes and picket-
ing to secure compliance with a statutory scheme of industrial rela-
tions designed to strike a reasonable balance of power between the
contending parties and to protect a congeries of public interests. As
my earlier discussion indicated, 6' the common law is left largely
intact and in the hands of the court, except to the extent that con-
duct is regulated by the Code as a matter of substantive law. In the
event of a potential conflict between two sets of legal rules operating
upon the same conduct, the legislative rules of course prevail. But
it is legislative rules and not common law which the board
administers.
The analogy to John East is virtually perfect. The Privy Council
355 John East case, supra, note 313, at 15o.
356 (x967) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 242 (S.C.C.), aff'g. (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 141
(MAN. C.A.).
357 (1967) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 242, at 250.
358 (5966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 541, at 157.
350 The first recorded use of the labour injunction in Anglo-Canadian jurispru-
dence was Springhead Spinning v. Reilly (x868) L.R. 6 EQ. 551.
360 See supra, part II G, The Rules of Economic Conflict.
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there sustained the board's power to order reinstatement of an em-
ployee discharged contrary to the Act, and rejected the provincial
appeal court's holding that
... the Board exercised a judicial power analogous to that of [section
96] courts ... on the ground that such Courts always had jurisdiction
in connection with the enforcement of contracts of hiring and awarding
damages for the breaches thereof.
And they continued:
But... this view ignores the wider aspects of the matter. The jurisdic-
tion of the Board ... is not invoked by the employee for the enforce-
ment of his contractual rights: those, whatever they may be, he can
assert elsewhere. But his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract
of employment might not by themselves justify, is the means by which
labour practices regarded as unfair are frustrated and the policy of
collective bargaining as a road to industrial peace is secured. It is in the
light of this new conception of industrial relations that the question to
be determined by the Board must be viewed, and, even if the issue so
raised can be regarded as a justiciable one, it finds no analogy in those
issues which were familiar to the Courts of 1867 .... 361
The Supreme Court of Canada has accepted this analysis in Trem-
blay v. La Commission des Relations du Quibec et al. 62 in relation
to the power of a labour relations board to dissolve an employer-
dominated trade union. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that
the same result would follow in relation to the British Columbia
board's powers to regulate strikes and picketing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Otto Kahn-Freund, the distinguished British labour law scholar, has
reminded us on more than one occasion to be restrained in our
enthusiasm for legal solutions. He has said:
Altogether, the longer one ponders the problem of industrial disputes,
the more sceptical one gets as regards the effectiveness of the law.
Industrial conflict is often a symptom rather than a disease. I think we
lawyers would do well to be modest in our claims to be able to provide
cures.
363
It is paradoxical that "the dullest bill' is the most ambitious Cana-
dian labour relations statute, in the sense that it is the most all-
361 Supra, note 313, at z50.
362 [x967] S.C.R. 697.
353 Kahn-Freund, LAEouR LAW: OLD TRADiTIONS AND NEw DEVELOPMENTS
(r967) 79.
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embracing and carefully integrated code of labour laws, but yet is
one of the most modest statutes, in the sense of Professor Kahm-
Freund's admonition. Whether they have accomplished their pur-
pose or not, it is evident the architects of the Code intended not so
much to provide "cures" as to urge, cajole, even coerce, the parties,
in their own interest and in the public interest, to exercise self-
restraint and to practise mutual accommodation. A worthy, if
unlikely, enterprise.
